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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DISPUTES, CLAIMS AND SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS RELATED TO THE 
TERRITORIAL SEA ISSUE IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS 
 
Gözen, Mine Pınar 
 
MIR, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan 
 
July 2005 
 
This master’s thesis aims to analyze, in detail, the issue of the extension of Greek 
territorial waters more than six nautical miles in the Aegean Sea, which can be 
accepted as an issue that constitutes the basis for other maritime disputes between 
Greece and Turkey. There are undoubtedly numerous studies on this topic. Thus, this 
research, while analyzing both the extent of the Greek territorial waters dispute and 
the problem related to the delimitation of the maritime boundaries between Greece 
and Turkey, aims to provide settlement proposals, and in this respect presents new 
approaches to the said conflicts.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
TÜRK-YUNAN İLİŞKİLERİNDE KARASULARI MESELESİNE DAİR 
ANLAŞMAZLIKLAR, İDDİALAR VE ÇÖZÜM ÖNERİLERİ  
 
Gözen, Mine Pınar 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan 
 
Temmuz 2005 
 
Bu yüksek lisans tez çalışması Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde önemli bir yer işgal eden ve 
Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında mevcut olan diğer Ege Denizi anlaşmazlıklarına 
temel oluşturduğu söylenebilecek olan Yunanistan’ın karasularının genişliği 
konusunda iki ülke arasında ortaya çıkan anlaşmazlığı ele almaktadır. Adı geçen 
konu üzerinde şüphesiz bugüne kadar bir çok çalışma yapılmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu 
çalışmada hem karasuları sınırlarının genişliği hem de karasularının sınırlandırılması 
konuları detaylı bir biçimde incelenmeye çalışılmış ve bu anlaşmazlıklara çözüm 
önerileri de sunularak soruna yeni yaklaşımların getirilmesi amaçlanmıştır.  
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: BMDHS, esas çizgi, ikili anlaşmazlıklar, karasuları, 
sınırlandırma 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Greece and Turkey, although neighbors sharing the same sea, namely the 
Aegean, generally have had a quarrelsome relationship, especially till 1999, and the 
conflicts between the two related either to the Aegean Sea or the Cyprus issue have 
always been a source of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean since the mid-1950s, 
and no permanent solution to any of the disputes is yet reached. In this respect, when 
the maritime disputes between the two States are taken into consideration solely, it 
can be claimed that the unstable and tense relationship concerning the Aegean Sea 
creates an unpleasant situation not only for Greece and Turkey but also for third flag 
states since the Aegean is an international route for navigation as well.  
In this context, the purpose of this study is to analyze, in detail, the issue of 
the extension of Greek territorial waters to twelve nautical miles in the Aegean Sea, 
which is an issue that constitutes the basis for other maritime disputes, and the 
problem related to the delimitation of the maritime boundaries between Greece and 
Turkey. However, different from the previous studies in the International Relations 
literature, this study aims to provide potential solutions for the settlement of the said 
disputes, and thus argues that Greek-Turkish maritime disputes are solvable if the 
parties mutually agree and desire to display and support frank efforts to this end.  
Given the above thesis statement, first all the history of Greek-Turkish 
relations since 1923 to the present will be studied in order to provide the necessary 
background to understand the quarrelsome nature of the relationship between the two 
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 countries, and to be able to understand the underlying reasons for the absence of a 
solution to these disputes. To this end, Chapter II studies the Greek-Turkish relations 
within two different contexts. Firstly, the bilateral relations will be explored in two 
main parts; relations before the emergence of the Cyprus issue, and relations in the 
aftermath of 1974. The basic reason to opt for a differentiation between the two 
periods is to underline the determination of the political leaders of both sides 
especially in the 1930s to establish peace, and good neighborly relations despite past 
hostilities, while outlining the factors which caused a complete change in the 
perception of the two states towards each other after the 1950s. Following this, 
Greek-Turkish relations will be explored within the framework of the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the European Union (EU), which will help the 
reader to understand the role of third parties in bilateral relations between Greece and 
Turkey. Finally, factors that negatively affected the pursuit of a solution to the 
Aegean disputes will also be enumerated.  
In the following chapter, the main issue of this study, the territorial sea issue, 
is studied in detail. To this end, first the claims and legal bases of the parties on the 
dispute will be taken into consideration. This will be followed by a description of the 
special circumstances in the Aegean. The last section of Chapter III discusses the 
impact of the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea on the Aegean 
disputes as well as bilateral attempts of Greece and Turkey. The first section of 
Chapter IV will mainly focus on the delimitation of the territorial sea issue. Then, 
proposals to achieve delimitation and proposals for the settlement of the territorial 
sea dispute are explored. Throughout these chapters, differences in the perceptions of 
the parties, bilateral attempts to resolve the law of the sea issues, international 
codification attempts related to the law of the sea, evolution of the territorial sea 
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 dispute between the two states, and vitality of delimitation of the territorial sea is 
studied. Finally, in the last chapter, the contributions of the ongoing confidential 
bilateral “exploratory talks” between Greece and Turkey, and the impact of the 
efforts by the European Union on establishing mutual understanding between the two 
states as well as on the settlement of the dispute(s) are discussed and an overall 
evaluation is provided.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Conflicts between Greece and Turkey have been a persistent threat to the 
security in the Eastern Mediterranean since the mid-1950s. To be able to understand 
the underlying reasons for the absence of a solution to the disputes between Greece 
and Turkey reference should be made to the history of the Greek-Turkish relations 
since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. In this context, it is possible to 
evaluate Greek-Turkish relations up to now in two main parts; relations before the 
emergence of the Cyprus issue, and relations in the aftermath of 1974.  
The historical roots of the conflicts between Greece and Turkey date from 
Byzantine and Ottoman times. Scholars have two different views on the beginnings 
of the conflict. Some trace this rivalry to 1071, to the defeat of the Byzantine Empire 
by the Selçuk Sultan Alparslan, whereas others claim that the capture of 
Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453 set a turning point for the relations. 
The latter argument is the commonly accepted one, and the assumption is that these 
conflicts emerge from issues of national identity. The birth of the Modern Greek 
state is an outcome of the national Greek struggle against Ottoman rule. The Megali 
Idea — the desire to unite Greeks under a common Greek state — is considered to be 
an influential force for the policies of Greece until the mid-1920s. In this respect, 
independence of Greece and its process of state building seem to be closely related to 
struggle against Turkey. 
 4  
  Correspondingly, the birth of the Turkish Republic resulted from the Turkish 
War of National Liberation, and in this proxy war against the Great Powers of 
Europe (mainly Great Britain) Turkey had to fight with Greece to end the occupation 
of central and western Anatolia by the Greek forces from May 1919 to September 
1922. In this context, the establishment of the modern Turkish state comprised the 
end of a neo-imperialistic ideology for Greece, which is the revival of the Byzantine 
Empire, and thus an important portion of the state building and formation of national 
identity of both Greece and Turkey to a certain extent depended on the events that 
had detrimental impact on the other state.1 While this state of affairs might have been 
embedded in the national consciousness respectively, there was a fresh start in 
relations under the leadership Eleftherios Venizelos and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
 
 
2.1. The Beginnings of a New Era: Lausanne Peace Treaty 
 
 Following the Turkish War of National Liberation, peace between Greece and 
Turkey came with the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. Thus, this was an 
agreement which put an end to the hostile behaviors of Greece and Turkey towards 
each other. Distinguished Greek diplomat Panayotis Pipinelis in his article “The 
Greco-Turkish Feud Revived” states that 
 
The Treaty of Lausanne did not represent just another truce in the long 
struggle against the Turks [but] meant a final arrangement, implying 
the wholehearted acceptance of the new status quo and the willingness 
to abandon forever all aspirations to revive the Byzantine Empire.2  
 
                                                 
1 Heinz Kramer, “Turkey’s Relations with Greece: Motives and Interests” in The Greek-Turkish 
Conflict in the 1990s, Dimitri Constas (ed.), (Great Britain: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 58. 
2 Pierre Oberling. The Road to Bellapais, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 27-28. 
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 There were various issues of discussion in this agreement. One main task of 
this treaty related to the Greek-Turkish relations was determination of sovereign 
control over disputed territories.3 In this context a major issue was the sovereignty 
over certain islands and Article 6/2 of the Treaty indicated that “In the absence of 
provisions to the contrary, in the present Treaty, islands and islets lying within three 
miles of the coast are included within the frontier of the coastal State”.4 This term 
was expressed in detail in Article 12 as well, and in Article 15, the names of the 
islands over which Turkey has renounced all rights in favor of Italy were 
enumerated.5 With regard to the islands, articles 4 and 6 of the Lausanne Straits 
Convention also dealt with the demilitarized status of the Strait region islands, and 
provided regulations concerning those.6 
 Building on the statements “islands and islets lying within three miles of the 
coast” (Art. 6) and “the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic 
                                                 
3 Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Political Clauses section, determined the territory of Turkey with 
Greece as follows: “Thence to the confluence of the Arda and the Maritza: the course of the Maritza; 
then upstream along the Arda, up to a point on that river to be determined on the spot in the immediate 
neighbourhood of the village of Tchorek-Keuy: the course of the Arda; thence in a south-easterly 
direction up to a point on the Maritza, 1 kilom. Below Bosna-Keuy: a roughly straight line leaving in 
Turkish territory the village of Bosna-Keuy. The village of Tchorek-Keuy shall be assigned to Greece 
or to Turkey according as the majority of the population shall be found to be Greek or Turkish by the 
Commission for which provision is made in Article 5, the population which has migrated into this 
village after the 11th October, 1922, not being taken into account; thence to the Aegean Sea: the 
course of the Maritza”. 
4 For the text of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, see Düstur [Compilation of Turkish Legal Rules] III, 5, 
16, (7) and 28 League of Nations Treaty Series (LoNTS), 11. Reg. No. 701. 
5 “The decision taken on the 13th February, 1914, by the Conference of London, in virtue of Articles 5 
of the Treaty of London of the 17th-30th May, 1913, and 15 of the Treaty of Athens of the 1st-14th 
November, 1913, which decision was communicated to the Greek Government on the 13th February, 
1914, regarding the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, other than 
the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, particularly the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, 
Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, is confirmed, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty 
respecting the islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy which form the subject of Article 15. 
Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less 
than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty”. (Article 12) 
“Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia 
(Astrapalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros 
(Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which 
are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizzo”. 
(Article 15) 
6 For the text of the Agreement, see Düstur [Compilation of Turkish Legal Rules] III, 5, 259, (106) or 
28 League of Nations Treaty Series (LoNTS), 115. Reg. No. 702. 
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 coast” (Art. 12), some scholars claim that the Lausanne Peace Treaty has established 
a breadth of territorial sea of 3 nautical miles (n.m.) in the Aegean. However, it 
should be noted that there was no explicit reference to the extent of the territorial sea 
in the said agreement. Thus, it seems that the Treaty did not explicitly regulate the 
extent of the territorial sea.  
Another important issue that the provisions of the Lausanne Peace Treaty 
attempted to solve was the rights of the minorities and the compulsory exchange of 
Greek and Turkish populations. In this respect, on 30 January 1923 the “Convention 
Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations” was signed between 
Greece and Turkey. According to the terms of the convention, beginning from 1 May 
1923, there would be “a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek 
Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the 
Moslem religion established in Greek territory” (Art. 1)7. This clause excluded the 
Greek inhabitants of Constantinople and the Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace. 
Accordingly it was stated that, 
 
All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, 
within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as 
defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of 
Constantinople. Moslems established in the region to the east of the 
frontier line laid down in 1918 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be 
considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace. 8 
 
 In this respect, according to Article 7 of the Convention emigrants would 
automatically obtain the nationality of the country that they were moving to, and thus 
lose the nationality of the country of their former residence. During departure 
emigrants were free to take with them moveable property, and they would be 
                                                 
7 Taken from the text of Lausanne Peace Treaty, (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/ed/eda/edaa/default.6.html). 
For the complete text of the Treaty, see Appendix A. 
8 Taken from the text of Lausanne Peace Treaty, (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/ed/eda/edaa/default.6.html). 
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 exempted from any tax or export duty. Moreover, the immovable property of the 
emigrants would be liquidated in accordance with the provisions determined by the 
Mixed Commission which was to be established. This Commission would consist of  
 
four members representing each of the High Contracting Parties, and of 
Nations from among nationals of Powers which did not take part in the 
war of 1914-1918, [and] the Presidency of the Commission shall be 
exercised in turn by each of these three neutral members (Article 11)9. 
 
This Commission completed its duties in a period of one and a half year. However, 
this was not a completely problem-free process. The different interpretations of the 
word “inhabitant”, which was “établis” in the original text in French, led to serious 
discussions among the contracting parties.10 The issue was first taken to the League 
of Nations by Greece in October 1924 and later, on 13 December, the Council of the 
League requested from the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory 
opinion on the issue.11  A conflict between Greece and Turkey arouse, and this 
problem was addressed with the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1925, which did 
not come into force in any manner. Further efforts to resolve the conflict became 
necessary and to this end in 1926 the Athens Agreement was signed between the two 
contracting parties. However, this agreement also could not provide a permanent 
solution to the dispute, and thus relations remained quite tense till the coming back of 
Eleftherios Venizelos to power.  
                                                 
9 For further information on the duties and powers of the Commission, see articles 12 and 13 in 
Appendix A. 
10 Turks interpreted the word “établis” as an equivalent of “domicile” which would refer to the Greeks 
registered as citizens of Istanbul under the 1914 Domicile Law of the Ottoman Empire. On the other 
hand, Greek understanding, which would comprise a larger number of Greek origin people, was that 
any Greek inhabitants who registered before 1918 should be considered as “établis”. (Alexander 
Alexis. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor 
Studies, 1992), pp. 113-114). For a Turkish academic view, see Baskın Oran, (ed.). Türk Dış 
Politikası (1919-1980), vol. I, 5th ed., (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 329-334. 
11 Alexander Alexis. (1992), pp. 115-116. 
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  Another issue debated during the Lausanne Peace Conference, which was a 
subject of disagreement, was related to the institution of Patriarchate. The Allies 
(except for Italy) were in favor of the idea that Patriarchate should remain in 
Istanbul. To this end, “Venizelos tried to win Turkish consent by offering help to 
retire Patriarch Meletios IV, whose anti-Turkish activities had been a source of great 
aggravation for Turkey’s leadership”.12 In the end, the Turkish Republic agreed for 
the continuation of the presence of the Patriarch in Istanbul with the caviat that the 
Patriarch would not intervene in Turkey’s domestic and political matters and he 
would confine himself only to purely religious matters. Moreover, it was indicated 
that if the Patriarch would remain within bounds of its powers, then it would be the 
obligation of the Turkish Republic to protect the interests and the legal personality of 
the Patriarch and the Patriarchate.   
 
 
2.2. Post-Lausanne Relations: 1928-1939 
 
The process of reconciliation had started by the efforts of Atatürk and 
Venizelos. Turkey after the First World War started to pursue an anti-revisionist and 
a status-quo oriented foreign policy. However, major changes were taking place on 
the part of Greece. Venizelos’ return to power as the prime minister in August 1928 
had a very positive and important impact on Greek-Turkish relations. Venizelos was 
to make changes in the foreign policy of Greece, and this would also be reflected in 
its alliance policies. The new Venizelos government abandoned the former irredentist 
polices and started to pursue a pro-status quo and security oriented foreign policy. 
Following this, there started a period of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. 
                                                 
12 Tozun Bahcheli. Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955, (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990), p. 12. 
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 Italy also supported such behavior and offered to be the arbiter if an agreement 
would be concluded between the two parties. The first positive attempt for the 
betterment of relations came from Greece on 30 August 1928 when Greek Prime 
Minister Venizelos sent an official letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. In 
the letter, Venizelos wrote that Greece believed that Turkey has no territorial claims 
over Greek territory, and indicated that, in the same manner, Greece did not have any 
territorial claims over Turkey. In this respect, he also underlined that Greece was 
sincerely willing to seek solutions for the existing problems between the two 
countries.13 The reply from İnönü, which came on 27 September, indicated that the 
letter of the Greek Prime Minister constituted the beginning of a new and sincere 
friendship period in Greek-Turkish relations.14 Here, it should be underlined that 
there is the willingness of the two sides to come to a mutual understanding and their 
threat perceptions are effective in such behavior. Greece saw the revisionist Bulgaria 
as a threat to its security, therefore security in the Balkans was very important for 
Athens and alliance with Turkey would be favorable in that respect.  
Following these developments, talks between Greek and Turkish 
governments started in December 1928. Both countries were conducting similar 
foreign policies as they pursued peaceful and friendly relationships with neighboring 
countries. Both states had concerns about developments taking place in Italy and 
revisionist Bulgaria. Thus, both countries came closer not only for the resolution of 
bilateral disputes, but also for political consequences such disputes may entail. 
 Following bilateral talks, Greece and Turkey signed a contract on 10 June 
1930 in Ankara to solve all the problems emanating from the population exchange 
issue. Following this, Greek Prime Minister Venizelos was invited to Turkey by 
                                                 
13 Baskın Oran, (ed.). Vol. I, 5th ed., (2001), p. 345. 
14 Baskın Oran, (ed.). Vol. I, 5th ed., (2001), p. 345. 
 10  
 Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. At the end of Venizelos’ visit, on 30 October 
1930, the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration was 
concluded, and a protocol on limiting naval arms was also added to the main 
agreement. This treaty aimed at establishing peaceful and friendly relations between 
Greece and Turkey and it is important because it is the first treaty aiming at such a 
goal.  
 The most important clauses of the treaty can be summarized as follows: The 
treaty brought with it the obligation of neutrality (articles 1 and 2). Secondly, it 
stated that if a dispute arises between the contracting parties, they should try to solve 
the issue through diplomatic channels. If this method fails to solve the dispute, then 
legal settlement or arbitration should be sought (articles 3 to 27).  
As indicated previously, in the annexed protocol of the 1930 Treaty of 
Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration an important issue, limiting of 
naval arms races, was taken into consideration. According to this protocol none of 
the parties would build or buy new naval war vessels without informing the other 
party six months beforehand. Thus, in a sense the naval arms races that started in 
1929 between the two countries due to their perception of each other as a threat had 
come to an end with the ratification of this protocol. 
 The 1930 Treaty was followed by the 1933 Turkish-Greek Cordial 
Agreement which can be considered as the second stage of the improvement of 
Greek-Turkish relations. Moreover, this pact provided a background for the Balkan 
Entente which was hoped to be concluded in the near future. With this treaty Greece 
and Turkey mutually guaranteed inviolability of their common territories (Article 1). 
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 Therefore, this provided a semblance of an alliance between Greece and Turkey 
against any revisionist power.15  
Greece and Turkey signed the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia and Rumania on 
9 February 1934. This agreement was quite similar to the Cordial Agreement of 
Greece and Turkey but this time four countries were party to it. Moreover, it was 
open to all Balkan countries. The idea of Balkan unity was first proposed by Greek 
Prime Minister Papanastasio in 1929. As indicated previously, the revisionist 
tendencies of Bulgaria was perceived as a threat to Greek security. To this end, 
Greece wanted to secure its position and sought for security in the Balkans. 
Corresponding to the efforts of Greece, there had been several conferences held 
between Balkan countries. Then, in 1934 came the official agreement, which became 
void after the German invasion of some the signatory Balkan countries.  
 The Entente consisted of three important articles, which are as follows:  
 
Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania and Turkey shall mutually guarantee the 
security of their Balkan borders. (Article 1) 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to reach agreement on 
measures which must be taken if cases should arise that could affect 
their interests as defined by the present Agreement. They assume the 
obligation not to take any political action towards any other Balkan 
country which is not a signatory to this Agreement, without a prior 
mutual notification and not to assume any political obligation towards 
any other Balkan country without the consent of the other Contracting 
Parties. (Article 2) 
The present Agreement shall come into force upon its signing by all the 
Contracting Powers and shall be ratified within the shortest possible 
time. The Agreement shall be open to any Balkan country for accession 
which shall be taken into favorable consideration by the Contracting 
Parties and shall come into effect as soon as the other signatory 
countries notify their consent. (Article 3)16 
 
                                                 
15 “In an effusive statement made during a brief visit to Athens in November 1933, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Aras declared that Greece and Turkey have almost become one country. During the 
following year, the two countries took another step in collaboration when they joined the Balkan 
Entente in 1934 with Yugoslavia and Rumania.” (Tozun Bahcheli. (1990), p. 14). 
16 Taken from http://www.mfa.gov.yu/History/pbs_e.html. 
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 According to these articles, first of all the Balkan borders of the said countries would 
be protected by each other. Secondly, the agreement aimed at achieving diplomatic 
cooperation between the signatory states. In the light of these, it is possible to 
conclude that Greece and Turkey were taking part in the formation of a block of 
status-quo states against revisionist ones and also trying to protect themselves from 
potential aggression from any revisionist power.  
 Although the ongoing peaceful and friendly relationship between Greece and 
Turkey (as when Greece supported Turkey to become a part of the League of Nations 
in 1932) was to get stronger with the conclusion of the Balkan Pact, there were also 
other developments taking place in world politics which would later on strain the 
relations between the two countries. In 1936, due to the developments taking place in 
international conjuncture, Turkey sent a note to the parties of the 1923 Straits 
Convention indicating Ankara’s concerns about the security of the Straits and its will 
to revise the Straits regime. Greece interpreted this request of Turkey in a positive 
manner. Later on, in July 1936 Montreux Straits Convention was signed between the 
related parties, excepting Italy until a year.  
 
 
2.3. Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of another Major War 
 
 In general terms, there was a consensus between Greece and Turkey both on 
bilateral issues and on issues related to the Balkan Pact. With respect to the changes 
in international politics and developments taking place in the Balkans, in 1938 
Greece and Turkey concluded the Additional Treaty to the 1930 Turkish-Greek 
Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration Agreement, and to the 1933 Turkish-Greek 
Cordial Agreement. This new agreement mainly aimed to strengthen the 1930 and 
 13  
 1933 treaties as well extending their period of validity for ten more years. However, 
the outbreak of World War II would change all the balances and bring about new 
challenges to the international milieu. Greece and Turkey aimed to preclude foreseen 
coercion of Italy and Germany by joining the Balkan Entente. Neither this alliance 
nor the bilateral Greek-Turkish agreements made a difference in terms of deterring 
Italy and Germany from seeking their ambitions and designs in the Balkans. Under 
given circumstances neither Greece nor Turkey was ready to face the challenges 
posed by a potential war against a great power. In this respect, Turkey remained 
neutral when Greece was occupied by German troops, which came after the failed 
Italian attempt to invade Greece.17 It should be noted that according to the clauses of 
the agreements mentioned in the previous paragraphs, neither Turkey nor Greece was 
obliged to enter into war in support of the other contracting party since neither 
Germany nor Italy was a Balkan country. Thus, in a sense, Turkey was using its right 
to remain neutral during these invasions. Nonetheless, this comprised a source of 
frustration on the part of Greece and of the Greek public since Greece was not 
assisted by its ally against Hitler and Mussolini.  
 Another issue that strained Greek- Turkish relations in the same period was 
the imposition of an emergency capital levy, called varlık vergisi (asset tax), on both 
Greek and other minorities living in Turkey in November 1942 by the Turkish 
Government. Upon this installment of higher levels of tax, the Greek government 
lodged protests to Ankara, and the emergency capital levy was removed by the 
Turkish government a year after its imposition.18 It should also be noted that another 
source of aggravation for Greece was the fact that Turkey did not appoint an 
ambassador to the Greek government in exile which was established in Crete. 
                                                 
17 Tozun Bahcheli. (1990), p. 14. 
18 Tozun Bahcheli. (1990), p. 15. 
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 However, during the Second World War Turkey recognized the Greek government 
was in exile, and continued its diplomatic correspondence. As indicated in the above 
quotation, “the Greek government [that] lodged protests to Ankara” was the Greek 
government in exile. Therefore, it is not possible to claim that Turkey cut its all 
diplomatic relations with Greece during the war.  
 In the course of World War II, Greece was also anxious about a possible 
Turkish occupation of the Dodecanese Islands and it also claimed that Turkey 
bargained with Germany on the fate of these islands. In fact, there is the claim that 
the Dodecanese islands were offered as a reward to Turkey first by the British, and 
later by the Germans for entering the war on their side. However, whether the said 
claim is valid or not throughout the war, Turkey was determined to remain non-
belligerent and apparently did not accept any of the offers. Moreover, although 
Turkey did not join the war on the side of the Greeks, it gave support to the defense 
of Greece through various means.19 
Following the end of the Second World War, there were changes in the 
international arena which would affect the relationship between Greece and Turkey 
that had become tense during the war. In this new period, Greece and Turkey shared 
the same concerns and benefits at the same time. Since both countries perceived the 
Soviet Union as a threat to their security, they decided to ally themselves with the 
Western countries. To this end, they became a part of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 
as well as the Marshall Plan. In August 1949, upon invitation, Greece and Turkey 
                                                 
19 “When Greece was attacked by Italy in 1940, hundreds of volunteers were organized among the 
Greek community of Istanbul and sent to fight in Greece’s defense, with the approval of the Turkish 
authorities. During 1941-1942, when Greece was under German occupation and experienced 
widespread starvation, Turkey dispatched food across the Aegean, earning the gratitude of the Greek 
public. Furthermore, the Turkish Government allowed Allied support of Greek guerillas from her 
territory, and permitted escapees from Greece, including military personnel, to pass through Turkish 
territory and reach the Allied forces in Egypt”. (Tozun Bahcheli. (1990), p. 16). 
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 became a member of the Council of Europe (CoE) in the first meeting of the Council 
of Ministers and the same year as the first admitted members. 
However, it should be underlined that this transition was not the same for 
Greece and Turkey. Turkey preferred to take part on the Western block due to its 
threat perceptions as well as economic concerns. Yet, Greeks went through important 
challenges throughout this process and a civil war took place in Greece as a result of 
the struggle for governance between different groups within the country. Even before 
the Second World War ended, more precisely in 1943, a civil war began in Greece 
between the Communist guerrilla group (EAM-ELAS) and the royalist group 
(EDES). This war continued till 1949 and also had an impact on the foreign policy of 
Turkey. In general terms, the Greek Civil War can be considered as the last phase of 
the communist control throughout the Balkans, thus Turkey was following the 
developments that were taking place in the territory of its neighbor with anxiety as it 
was left alone between communist countries. In this context, it is possible to claim 
that the Greek civil war started to have an international character after the 
intervention of the northern neighbors of Greece in this war.  
It should be noted that the British troops that were sent to Greece in 1944 
remained in Greek territory after the end of the Second World War. The purpose was 
to give support to the Greek state in its fight against communism. However, as a 
result of the devastation caused by the long lasting war, Britain had to cut its military 
and economic support towards Greece. The economic support that was provided to 
Turkey by the British also came to an end because of the same reason. Following 
this, in 1947, the U.S. President Harry Truman declared the “Truman Doctrine”. 
Under this framework, advisory groups of officers were sent to Greece and in 
addition to military aid, economic aid was also provided. Along with Greece, Turkey 
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 also benefited from this aid. Again, in 1947, Yugoslavia closed its borders to the 
support that was going to the communist groups in Greece since Belgrade had 
decided to leave the Soviet block in 1948.  
Following American military and economic aid and with the end of the 
support received from Yugoslavia, the end of the Greek Civil War came in 1949. 
After the end of the civil war in Greece, both Greece and Turkey voluntarily came 
under cover of the western block. Following the international events taking place, 
both Greece and Turkey participated in the Korean War. Subsequently, in 1952 they 
were admitted as members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, 
in a sense, the Greek-Turkish political and military cooperation was institutionalized 
under the framework of NATO. 
Collaboration between the two countries continued with another regional 
political organization to which Yugoslavia was also a party, one however was not 
destined to last long. After Yugoslavia closed its borders to aid going to the Greek 
communists in the north, there started a rapprochement between Greece and 
Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Turkey did not have any problems with Yugoslavia 
in particular, and it was content about Yugoslavia’s defection from the Soviet block. 
Following these events, talks between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia started in 
1952, and the foreign ministers signed a "Friendship and Cooperation Treaty" on 28 
February 1953, in Ankara. This treaty was the first phase towards a tripartite pact. 
According to articles 1, 2 and 3 of the treaty, the contracting states would consult 
each other on issues related to their common interests, and correspondingly foreign 
ministers of the member states would convene at least once a year.  
As a result of the regular meetings that took place between the Foreign 
Ministers, these three states signed the Treaty of Bled on 9 August 1954. According 
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 to this treaty, an attack against any of the contracting parties would be considered as 
an attack against the three of the states together, and thus all the necessary measures, 
(including use of military force) would be taken. In April of 1955 the tripartite pact, 
which was also supported by the US as it was a part of US’ containment policy, was 
put into force. However, it did not last long. Changes in Soviet foreign policy after 
the death of Stalin changed the attitude of the Yugoslav leader Tito towards the 
Soviet Union, when the Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev made a visit of 
reconciliation to Belgrade. Disputes related to the Cyprus issue contributed to this, 
and the positive relationship provided and encouraged by the pact between the 
parties started to diminish.  
 
 
2.4. The Emergence of the Cyprus Issue and Its Aftermath 
 
 In this respect, the beginnings of the movement of “enosis” on the island of 
Cyprus in the mid-1950s increased tension between Greece and Turkey. “The Cyprus 
problem rekindled the flames of a smoldering fire (chosen traumas and chosen 
glories) that had been hidden under the ashes of the time”20. With reference to the 
facts that were studied previously, it is possible to conclude that Greece and Turkey 
did not have major bilateral disputes in times when Greece had internal or external 
problems (e.g. during Greek Civil War or Second World War). Also, when the 
perceived threat from the Balkans faded away for Greece, Greek need for the Turkish 
alliance also lost its priority. In this respect, the willingness of the two sides to come 
to a mutual understanding and their threat perceptions had (and still has) a prominent 
role in determining the relations between them. 
                                                 
20 Vamık Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz. Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict, (England: The 
Eothen Press, 1994), p. 126. 
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  Thus, the period between 1950 and 1955 comprised the final years of the 
friendly relations between Greece and Turkey for a long time to come. The outbreak 
of the Cyprus issue revived the past negative memories of the two parties towards 
each other, and consisted the beginning of long lasting disputes between Athens and 
Ankara. Consequently, in a sense, the peaceful relations between the parties that 
were established in the aftermath of the Lausanne Peace Treaty came to an end in the 
mid-1950s.  
The positive relationship provided and encouraged by bilateral talks and pacts 
between the two parties started to disappear with the emergence of the Cyprus 
dispute, especially after the Turkish “Peace Operation” to the island of Cyprus in 
1974, which is named by the Greeks as the Turkish “invasion” of the island. Apart 
from the Cyprus issue, and the conflict over the status and the rights of Western 
Thracian Turks as minorities, Greece and Turkey currently have several other 
conflicts related to their respective sovereign rights over the use of the Aegean Sea 
and its airspace. It is possible to list these disputes concerning the Aegean as 
follows21: 
• The extent and the delimitation of the territorial sea areas, 
• The extent of Greek air space and issues related to air traffic services, 
• The delimitation of the continental shelf, 
• The demilitarized status of the Eastern Aegean Islands, 
• Sovereignty over certain islands, islets and rocks. 
Following the Cyprus issue other events took place that strained Greek-
Turkish relations. There was the tension between Greece and Turkey related to the 
                                                 
21 For a detailed analysis of the disputes refer to Yüksel İnan and Yücel Acer, “The Aegean Disputes” 
in The Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, Karaosmanoğlu & Taşhan 
(eds.), (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004), pp. 125-146. 
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 Greek militarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands. Then, came the Greek practice of 
ten n.m. of airspace in the Aegean, which started in 1931 and was opposed to by 
Turkey in 1975 due to the chancing circumstances resulting from the NATO 
practices and documents such as AAP-6 and NATINAD22. Thus, this also led to 
other disputes related to the Aegean airspace, (e.g. the FIR issue). 
In 1974, Turkey also began research activities on the Aegean continental 
shelf, however opposition to this research came from Greece as it claimed that the 
areas of exploration were in the Greek continental shelf. This dispute later on was 
brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by Greece based upon the UN 
Security Council Resolution No. 395, dated 25 August 1976.23 However, the ICJ on 
19 December 1978 decided that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case.  
In addition to these problems, Greece ratified the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1995 and repeatedly announced its intention to extend its 
territorial sea to twelve n.m.. Thus, the extension of the Greek territorial sea more 
than six n.m. added one more dispute that remains to be resolved between Greece 
and Turkey. Also, in 1996 the crisis on Kardak (Imia) Rocks took place, which was 
an event that escalated the tension.  
Attempts of solving the disputes, mainly on the continental shelf, officially 
started with the 11 November 1976 Bern Agreement 24  first and continued with 
bilateral talks, and no solution is yet provided. However, the bilateral relationship 
between the two states continued and still continues on different international 
platforms as well as the exploratory talks which are conducted by high ranking 
bureaucrats since February 2002. 
                                                 
22 Y. Acer and Y. İnan. (2004), p. 138. 
23 For the text of the Resolution No. 395, see Appendix D. 
24  For the text of the Agreement, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, (1976), p. 2936, and 
Appendix E. 
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2.5. Greek-Turkish Relations and the Role of the BSEC 
 
There were several unsuccessful efforts for the betterment of relations 
between the two countries. In this context, Turkey’s invitation to Greece to join the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation in 1992 is considered to be a goodwill gesture by 
some scholars, in political terms simply because Greece is not a Black Sea littoral 
sea. However, the consequences of this decision had important implications, which 
later had and still have a straining impact on the two countries. When the evolution 
of the relations between Greece and Turkey is examined, it can be realized that the 
two countries mainly had agreements on military and security issues in the years 
which correspond to the period between the conclusion of the Lausanne Peace Treaty 
and the emergence of the Cyprus issue (the main economic relationship between 
Greece and Turkey depended on receiving Marshall Aid from the US at that time). 
Later on, the relations and talks between the two countries were determined by the 
conflicts that existed and still exist between the two. 
Therefore, in general terms relations depended on political and military 
issues. In this respect, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation could provide a platform 
of economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey, which hopefully would be 
followed by political cooperation.  
 
Today, the Turks believe that the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Region (BSEC) has proved itself a successful organization in which "the 
participating states have put aside their differences and undertook joint 
economic projects for their mutual benefit." At the same time, the BSEC 
clearly showed that the Islamic and the Christian states would cooperate 
smoothly in a regional organization without any religious or cultural 
friction. According to a senior Turkish foreign policy elite, "...since its 
inception the BSEC has asserted itself to be an important confidence 
building measure and, as such, an essential element of peace and stability 
in the region." The varying national interests, differing political 
assessments and diverse stages of development of the participating states 
have not prevented them from seeking common solutions to their 
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 problems through dialogue, economic cooperation, and creating an 
environment conducive to regional stability. 25 
 
However, actual experiences proved the opposite. The BSEC does not really 
operate efficiently. Moreover, in terms of bilateral relations, there are various 
problems that can be enumerated. In this respect, Greece’s admission to the 
Organization as a member did not help to ease relations between Greece and Turkey. 
When Greek opportunism was coupled with Turkey’s lack of interest on the 
operation of the Organization, Greece maintained a leading role for itself in the 
BSEC which is ironically an organization initiated by Turkey. Thus, Greece’s 
membership became more disadvantageous for Turkey as time passed. BSEC as a 
purely economic organization in the region only provided more political conflicts or 
frictions rather than economic cooperation for Greece and Turkey.  
 
 
2.6. Greece, Turkey and the European Union 
 
Apart from the BSEC, Greece and Turkey mainly have relations within the 
framework of the European Union (EU). In this context, the relationship between 
Greece, Turkey and the EU also has a prominent role in the shape of Greek-Turkish 
relations. It should be reminded that Greece applied for full membership in 1975 but 
Turkey did not make an application due to domestic political reasons. On April 14, 
1987 Turkey applied for full membership whereas Greece was accepted to the Union 
in 1981 as a full member that is equipped with a veto power, and this constituted a 
turning point in Greek-Turkish and Turkish-EU relations. Following Greece’s 
                                                 
25 M. Fatih Tayfur. “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis”, in Foreign Policy, A Quarterly of the 
Foreign Policy Institute, Vol. XXIII, Nos. 1-2-3-4, 1999, p. 59. 
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 accession to the EU, the Union also and inevitably became an ipso facto third party 
to the Greek-Turkish disputes.  
 Greece started to make use of its full membership against Turkey within the 
EU in the late 1980s and this continued also in 1990s. At the early years of Greece’s 
accession to the EU, Turkish-EU relations were at a point of suspension due to the 
1980 military coup (coup d’état) that took place in Turkey. The promised financial 
aid of the Fourth Financial Protocol was postponed by the EC as a response to this 
event. In line with these developments the Greek government started to bring its 
bilateral disputes before the EU. Following the 1980 Turkish military coup, Greece 
took a stand against Turkey in its correspondence with the EU. The first example is 
the 1986 Greek objection to the EC Commission decision for the continuation of the 
financial aid to Turkey, which was formerly suspended due to the military coup in 
Turkey. 
 With the Turkish application for full membership to the EC on 16 April 
1987, Greece this time brought about the Cyprus dispute to the attention of the 
Community. This was followed by a resolution on Cyprus by the European 
Parliament dated 20 May 1988.26 In this context, an issue which was never supposed 
to be a criterion for Turkish accession to the EC/EU was to become an obstacle for 
Turkey. Thus, this led to deterioration in Turkish-EU relations, and in the long-term 
it became a considerable handicap for Ankara, which still has implications.27 
                                                 
26 ‘This resolution strongly condemned Turkey because of its Cyprus policy; the Strasbourg Chamber 
noted inter alia that: “…the unlawful occupation of part of the territory of a country associated with 
the Community (i.e. the Republic of Cyprus) by the military forces of another country, also associated 
with the Community (i.e. Turkey), presents a major stumbling block to the normalization of relations 
with the latter, viz. Turkey”.’ (Behice Özlem Gökakın. (2001), p. 68). 
27 In mid 1988, Greece became a de jure party to the Association Agreement between Turkey and the 
European Community, upon a domestic unilateral legal ratification procedure by Turkey. (Turkish 
Official Gazette, no. 19857, 29 June 1988). The provisions of article 5 of the Protocol signed between 
Turkey and the European Union Council on 20 April 1988 indicated that this Protocol ought to be 
ratified by the 15 members of the Union in accordance with their constitutional procedures, and an 
exchange of notes related to ratification ought to be realized.  
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 This problem was coupled with the Greek Cypriot application for the EU 
membership on 3 July 1990, and this led to the immediate reaction of the Turkish 
Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) as well as of the Turkish Government on the 
basis of the 1960 Guarantee Agreement. Article 1 of this treaty reads as follows: 
“[The Republic of Cyprus is bound] not to participate, in whole or in part, in any 
political or economic union with any state whatsoever”. In general, Turks argue on 
the basis of article 1 of the Guarantee Treaty as a legal footing for objection to the 
accession of the Republic of Cyprus. However, the document entitled “Basic 
Structure of the Republic of Cyprus” also provides evidence and articles supporting 
this idea. The first reference is Article 8, which indicates that  
 
The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall 
have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign 
affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international 
organizations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both 
participate or concerning defence and security as defined in Annex I. 
 
Another article that constitutes a standpoint is Article 22, and it reads as follows: “it 
shall be recognized that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State, or a 
separatist independence of Cyprus (i.e. the partition of Cyprus into two independent 
States), shall be excluded”. Thus, this provision prohibits the union of the State with 
another state as well as prohibiting a separation for independence. Similarly, Article 
50 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus indicates that  
 
The President and the Vice-President of the Republic, separately or 
conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision of the 
House of the Representatives or any part thereof concerning – (a) foreign 
affairs, except the participation of the Republic in international 
organizations and pacts of alliance in which the Kingdom of Greece and 
the Republic of Turkey both participate.  
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 In light of this, accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU was unacceptable for 
Turkey, and with this development, tension between Greece and Turkey, as well as 
Turkey and the EU increased once again. 
Following this, in 1994 Greek efforts to include the Republic of Cyprus in the 
enlargement agenda of the EU turned out to be successful. So, the Cyprus issue, 
which Turkey has always considered as a separate problem, was officially placed on 
the EU agenda. It should be indicated that this was not an explicitly expressed 
criterion at the time since the only political criteria for membership was and still is 
the Copenhagen criteria28. Thus, it can be observed that the Cyprus issue obtained the 
status of a criterion for Turkey as it can be inferred from the Copenhagen criteria, 
which seems to constitute a must for Turkey for its accession to the Union as a full 
member since the Republic of Cyprus, as an EU member, has the legal right to veto a 
state’s membership.29  
Following the Helsinki Presidential Conclusions, in the 2000 Regular Report 
from the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession, a special section was 
                                                 
28  The Copenhagen membership criteria require the achievement of the following points by the 
candidate country: “(1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities; (2) the existence of a functioning market economy as well 
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; (3) the ability to 
take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & 
monetary union”. 
29 Accordingly, in the 1999 Helsinki Presidential Summit Conclusions, there were direct references to 
the issue in paragraph 9 which reads as follows: “(a) The European Council welcomes the launch of 
the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York 
and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the process to a 
successful conclusion. 
(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus 
to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, 
the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the 
Council will take account of all relevant factors.” 
There is also an indirect reference in paragraph 4 of the document which underlines the importance of 
the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the resolution of any outstanding border disputes and 
other related issues. Since compliance with the Copenhagen criteria is indicated to be a prerequisite in 
this article, it can be inferred from the statement that Turkey is bound to solve the dispute if it wants 
its application for EU membership to be seriously considered for accession negotiations. Finally, the 
content of paragraph 12, which is solely on Turkey, emphasizes the importance of the fulfillment of 
the criteria while making a precise reference to the issues indicated in paragraphs 4 and 9/a. The text 
of the Summit Conclusion is available on the Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey 
website: www.deltur.cec.eu.int  
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 reserved for the Cyprus Issue. This report stated the positive step achieved on the 
Cyprus dispute, which was direct negotiations of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
leaders for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. It was also indicated 
that Turkey violated the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights by 
committing a continuing violation of the rights of a Greek Cypriot and also by 
refusing to execute the judgment of the Court.30  
The Accession Partnership Document for Turkey dated 8 November 2000 
also made reference to the Cyprus issue by stating that “the European Union 
encourages Turkey, together with all parties, to continue to support the UN Secretary 
General’s efforts to bring the process, aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cyprus problem, to a successful conclusion.” Similar views were also raised in the 
2001 and 2002 reports. The 2003 Accession Partnership document for Turkey also 
indicated the same point under the priorities (2003/2004) section.31 
In line with the statements/recommendations of the European Union, Turkey 
continued its correspondence regarding the Cyprus issue, in this context the Fifth and 
the final Annan Plan comprised a decisive turning point in the history of the conflict. 
According to the European perception Turkey was the side which always caused 
problems in the dispute. Although the primary predictions as an outcome of the 
referenda held in Cyprus was “yes” from the South and “no” from the North, results 
of the referenda this time revealed the opposite since the answer of the Turkish north 
was “yes” whereas the Greek Cypriots voted for “no”. No matter what the result of 
the referenda was, the Republic of Cyprus acceded to the Union alone on 1 May 
                                                 
30 The statement is in section 1.3 titled “Cyprus Issue”, paragraph 4, p. 20 of the 2000 Regular Report 
for Turkey. The text is available on  
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/tu_en.pdf  
31 The statement was: “In accordance with the Helsinki Conclusions, in the context of the political 
dialogue, strongly support efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem through 
the continuation of the United Nations Secretary General's mission of good offices and of negotiations 
on the basis of his proposals”. 
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 2004 due to the Summit Decisions of 2003,32 and those decisions prove that the EU 
has been insistent on the accession of Cyprus to the Union as it was implicitly 
underlined by the December 1999 Helsinki Summit33.  
 Apart from the Cyprus criteria, Greece made use of its bilateral disputes in 
the Aegean against Turkey within the framework of the EU. The Kardak crisis that 
broke out right after Turkey’s signing of the Customs Union Agreement constituted 
a new phase in Turkish-EU relations. On 15 July 1996, with a declaration, the EU 
indicated that Turkey should agree to an international legal arbitration of the ICJ 
concerning the Aegean dispute.34 In the meantime, Greece also vetoed the financial 
aid that was to be extended to Turkey as a compensation for the losses to be incurred 
by the Customs Union. Greece kept its firm stance against Turkey in the 1997 
Luxembourg Summit as well.35  
 However, the Greek stance against Turkey, which definitely had a 
deteriorating impact on Turkish-EU relations was to change in 1999. Just before the 
                                                 
32  “The European Council reaffirms its decisions taken at Copenhagen with regard to Cyprus's 
accession to the EU”. (Presidency Conclusions - Brussels, 20 and 21 March 2003, par. 85). “Cyprus' 
accession to our Union is already creating favourable conditions for the two communities to reach a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem”. (Presidency Conclusions – Thessaloniki, 19 and 
20 June 2003, par. 39). “In line with its relevant conclusions, the European Council reiterates its 
preference for a reunited Cyprus to join the Union on 1 May 2004, in order to allow all Cypriots to 
enjoy a secure and prosperous future and the benefits of EU accession. It considers that there is a good 
prospect of reaching a just, viable and functional settlement by 1 May 2004, consistent with the 
relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The European Council therefore again urges all parties 
concerned, and in particular Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, to support the UN Secretary 
General's efforts strongly and, in this context, calls for an immediate resumption of the talks on the 
basis of his proposals. The Union reiterates its willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement 
in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. In this context, the European Council 
welcomes the Commission's willingness to offer assistance for a speedy solution within the 
framework of the acquis. Following a settlement, the Union is ready to provide financial assistance for 
the development of the northern part of Cyprus and the Commission would be called upon to prepare 
all necessary steps for lifting the suspension of the acquis, in accordance with Protocol 10 to the Act 
of Accession”. (Presidency Conclusions – Brussels, 12/13 December 2003, par. 42). 
33 “The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus 
to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, 
the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the 
Council will take account of all relevant factors”. (par. 9/b) The text of the Summit is available on 
www.deltur.cec.eu.int. 
34 For the text of the Declaration, see Appendix F. 
35 The outcomes of this were indicated in the chronology section. 
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 1999 EU Summit, the Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou told in a Greek 
radio that “I believe a positive message to Turkey must be sent from [the EU 
summit in] Copenhagen”.36 In line with this statement, Greece lifted its veto on 
Turkey’s EU candidacy. It should also be noted that with regard to the change in 
Greek stance, Turkey also changed its path and started to pursue a different foreign 
policy in the sense that it started to develop close relationships with Greece and Italy 
which became supporters of Turkish membership to the EU. Despite the positive 
change in the Greek attitude towards Turkey’s EU membership, the Cyprus issue 
which was added to the agenda of the EU by Greece also became a main 
determinant of Turkey’s prolonged accession process.  
The Greek Cypriot application for EU membership on 3 July 1990, also had a 
straining impact on Greek-Turkish and Turkey-EU relations. The immediate reaction 
of the Turkish government was expressed on the basis of the 1960 Guarantee 
Agreement.37 With this development, tension between Greece and Turkey, as well as 
Turkey and the EU increased once again. Therefore, it can be argued that by 
abandoning its veto on Turkey, Greece no longer had to carry the burdens of being a 
persistent objector regarding the Turkish case. Since this had important political 
costs for Greece, the change in Greek stance can be considered as a strategic move. 
In this context, a complementary argument is that the change in Greek position may 
also have a domestic aspect since the tensions between Greece and Turkey had and 
has an increasing impact on the military expenditures of Greece. The Simitis 
government seemed to prefer to allocate some of the military expenditures to the 
social welfare of its citizens, since the Greek people started to benefit from the rate 
                                                 
36 Taken from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2315791.stm. 
37 Article 1 of this treaty reads as follows: “[The Republic of Cyprus is bound] not to participate, in 
whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever”. 
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 of economic growth and prosperity in a positive manner, which can obviously be 
observed from their way of life not only in Greece but also abroad.  
As noted previously whether Greece raises a veto or not, issues of concern for 
Greece such as outstanding border disputes38 and the Cyprus question are already on 
the agenda of the EU. Moreover, previous experiences of the EU countries, which 
are getting involved in the Greek-Turkish bilateral disputes, currently comprises a 
concern on the part of the Union members as they do not want to be involved in 
Turkey’s other problems with its neighbors in the Middle East and the Caucasus. 
Thus, this also constitutes an obstacle for Turkey in its effort to become a full 
member of the EU.  
In this respect, it is possible to argue that Greece had nothing to lose when it 
changed its stance against Turkey since the necessary measures were to be taken by 
the EU itself automatically. A basic example is the issue of bilateral relations 
between Greece and Turkey, which is also noted in the 2000 and 2003 Accession 
Partnership documents for Turkey.39 The related paragraph reads as follows:   
 
In accordance with the Helsinki Conclusions, in the context of the 
political dialogue, under the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes 
in accordance with the UN Charter, [candidate states, including Turkey 
are to] make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and 
other related issues, as referred to in point 4 of the Helsinki conclusions. 
 
Here, it should be noted that Turkey is not the sole party to make efforts to solve 
border disputes related to the Aegean. Moreover, contrary to the Greek claims that 
Turkey has an expansionist policy towards Greece, Turkey only tries to protect the 
                                                 
38 An evaluation of peaceful settlement of the disputes issue is studied in section 1.5 of the 2004 
Regular Report on Turkey. In the general evaluation section (1.6) a brief assessment, which reads as 
follows, is provided. “As regards the enhanced political dialogue, relations with Greece developed 
positively. A series of bilateral agreements were signed and several confidence building measures 
adopted. A process of exploratory talks has continued”.  
39 For the texts of the Accession Partnership Documents, see www.deltur.cec.eu.int. 
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 existing status quo, and it does not try to obtain new territories in the Aegean Sea.40 
Nonetheless, 17 December 2004 EU Summit once again, in its provision number 20,  
 
reaffirmed its view that unresolved disputes having repercussions on the 
accession process, should if necessary be brought to the International 
Court of Justice for settlement. The European Council will be kept 
informed of progress achieved which it will review as appropriate.41 
 
With this provision, the constant supervision of the EU over Greek-Turkish bilateral 
disputes was also granted.42 
Nonetheless, Greece’s abandonment of its veto policy towards Turkey in 
1999 has brought about a quest for better relations between the two countries and this 
continuing improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey since 1999 is also 
expressed in the 2004 Regular Report on Turkey under section 1.5 entitled “Peaceful 
settlement of border disputes.” However, it is quite obvious that there is lack of 
confidence in both countries towards each other. ‘He [Karamanlis] predicted that 
relations with Turkey would improve as it carried out the terms imposed by the EU 
but also noted that “a country’s behavior does not change in a month.”43 As it is well 
stated by Karamanlis, countries’ behavior does not change quickly and Greece’s 
attitude towards Turkey has not changed much either. The current Greek attitude is 
more like a silent opposition to Turkey since Greece naturally continues to consider 
                                                 
40 It should be reminded that Greece claims and intends to declare 12 nautical miles of territorial sea in 
the Aegean based on the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and this is where the 
bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey emanate from. In that respect, it cannot be argued that 
Turkey has territorial claims over Greece. The issue of sovereignty over certain islands, islets and 
rocks remains to be negotiated by the two parties since no unchallengeable official document, which is 
in force, expressly states the status of these territories. 
41 For the complete text, see www.deltur.cec.eu.int. 
42 “In accordance with its previous conclusions, notably those of Helsinki on this matter, the European 
Council reviewed the situation relating to outstanding disputes and welcomed the exploratory contacts 
to this end. In this connection it reaffirmed its view that unresolved disputes having repercussions on 
the accession process, should if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice for 
settlement. The European Council will be kept informed of progress achieved which it will review as 
appropriate”. (Presidency Conclusions – Brussels, 16/17 December 2004). 
43 Athens News Agency article titled “EU summit conclusions on Turkey improve on those at Helsinki, 
PM says”, (21 December 2004). Taken from http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/. 
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 its national interest. It should also be noted that Greek statesmen do not really try to 
change the negative public opinion towards Turkey whereas Turkey hopes to become 
a part of a larger society, namely the European community.  
In this context, although the Cyprus question was considered to be an 
insolvable problem for Turkey on its way towards EU membership, political 
developments prior to 17 December proved that Turkey was ready to make every 
effort to solve the problem. The 17 December 2004 EU Summit that convened in 
Brussels constituted a milestone for Turkish-EU relations as Turkey was given the 
date of 3 October 2005 for the commencement of accession negotiations as well as 
bringing about an issue which Turkey tended to disregard up to date. As a result of 
the Summit decisions, Turkey will have to extend the customs union to the Republic 
of Cyprus before 3 October 2005.44 Ankara has been hesitant about signing the 
protocol as this would mean the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus but now this 
stands as an obligation on the part of Turkey for the commencement of accession 
negotiations. 45 
                                                 
44 Two direct references from 2004 Presidency Conclusions can be enumerated as follows:  
‘31. The European Council invites Turkey to conclude negotiations with the Commission on behalf of 
the Community and its 25 Member States on the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement to take account 
of the accession of the new Member States.’ (Presidency Conclusions – Brussels, 17 and 18 June 
2004). 
‘19. The European Council welcomed Turkey's decision to sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation 
of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten new Member States. 
In this light, it welcomed the declaration of Turkey that "the Turkish Government confirms that it is 
ready to sign the Protocol on the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement prior to the actual start of 
accession negotiations and after reaching agreement on and finalising the adaptations which are 
necessary in view of the current membership of the European Union".’ (Presidency Conclusions – 
Brussels, 16/17 and 18 December 2004). 
45 ‘Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos has said he is satisfied with the outcome of the EU summit 
in Brussels, which decided to give Turkey a date to commence accession negotiations. “We put 
forward our demands and I think today's decision satisfies our demands to a great extent,” he told [at] 
a press conference in Brussels on Friday. The Cypriot president added that the decision grants the 
Republic of Cyprus the right to veto Turkey's EU course, in the event that Ankara does not fulfill its 
commitment to sign the customs union protocol. “The protocol covered many of the demands we had 
put forward,” the president added’. Athens News Agency article titled “Cyprus president satisfied 
with EU summit decision on Turkey”, (18 December, 2004). Taken from www.greekembassy.org.  
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 This Summit once again proved the validity of the considerable Greek impact 
in Turkey’s accession process. The statement of Greek Prime Minister Costas 
Karamanlis, which is quoted below, constitutes a prominent example to this: 
 
"We did really well. We achieved all our goals," Prime Minister Costas 
Karamanlis stressed, summing up his views on the outcome of the two-
day EU Summit which [was] concluded in Brussels on Friday, after long 
and intense negotiations. Karamanlis outlined the five goals the 
government had set and which have been achieved fully. They are:  
1.  Shaping of a European context which will include Turkey's behavior 
towards Greece; 
2.  A mechanism of continuous observation and control of Turkey's 
behavior; 
3.  Inclusion of a safeguard that will limit free movement of people; 
4.  Assurance that Turkey will respect human and religious rights; 
5.  Linking Turkey's EU progress with a commitment to improve its 
relations with the Republic of Cyprus. 
The Greek premier also emphasized that Greece was able to achieve the 
above goals thanks to close cooperation with Cyprus and President 
Tassos Papadopoulos.46 
 
In this context, Greece seems to have abandoned its veto policy towards 
Turkey. However, one cannot guarantee a positive vote from the Republic of Cyprus 
as it can be inferred from the statements of the Greek Cypriot leader Tassos 
Papadopoulos. Furthermore, there is a new concern, which is openly expressed by 
European countries without any hesitation, the cultural differences issue. In the 
recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards 
accession dated 6 October 2004, prepared by the Commission of the European 
Communities, it is indicated that the accession of Turkey to the European Union 
constitutes a challenge for both the EU and Turkey. It is also stated that “Turkey’s 
accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined 
impact of Turkey’s population, size, geographical location, economic, security and 
                                                 
46 Athens News Agency article titled "We achieved all our goals," Karamanlis says of EU Summit 
outcome, (18 December, 2004). Taken from www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/.  
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 military potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics”. 47  Likewise, 
officials of the European Union countries each time express that their populations are 
concerned about the major cultural differences between the EU countries and 
Turkey, and that they have hesitations about the accession of Turkey to the EU. A 
new obstacle on the part of Turkey seems to be added to the issues that Turkey has to 
cope with to become a member of the EU. In the article entitled Stephanopoulos 
criticism of EU dated 20 December 2004 it is stated that 
 
A day earlier, Greek President Stephanopoulos sharply criticized the 
European Union's policy vis-a-vis Turkey's long-coveted goal of 
beginning EU accession negotiations, in the aftermath of the Union's 
decision to give the predominately Muslim country a conditional "green 
light" to begin entry talks in early October 2005.48 
 
From this statement it can be inferred that Greece is still not very sincerely 
supportive of Turkey’s accession to the Union, but it would no more have a direct 
hampering impact on Turkey’s accession process as it did until 1999, which has 
implications that still seem inherent. 
 
 
2.7. Conclusion of the Historical Background 
 
 All in all, with respect to the periods analyzed in the previous sections it can 
be concluded that the beginnings of the “enosis” movement on the island of Cyprus 
in the mid-1950s increased the tension between Greece and Turkey as well as 
reviving the past negative memories of the two parties towards each other. Therefore, 
the period between 1950 and 1955 comprised the final years of friendly relations 
                                                 
47 Section 3: Assessing The Issues Arising From Turkey’s Membership Perspective, paragraph 1 and 
bullet point number 1. 
48 Taken from http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/.  
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 between Greece and Turkey for a long time to come since the outbreak of the Cyprus 
issue consisted the beginning of long lasting disputes.  
Despite the ongoing conflicts between Greece and Turkey on various 
subjects, currently there are efforts to achieve a solution to the disputes related to the 
Aegean Sea. The rapprochement process between Greece and Turkey is going on 
since 1999, moreover in March 2002 exploratory talks started between the two 
countries. There had been 29 meetings till the end of 2004, and the most recent 
meeting took place on 23 February 2005 in Ankara. Currently the exploratory talks 
are continuing and solutions to the Aegean disputes are being sought.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE TERRITORIAL SEA ISSUE 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the Lausanne Peace Treaty marked the 
beginning of a peaceful era in Greek-Turkish relations, and established a so-called 
and accepted equilibrium between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea by 
harmonizing vital interests, in which the existent practice of the width of the 
territorial seas of both countries were set at three n.m.. However, in 1936, Greece 
extended its territorial waters to six n.m. and upset the status quo in the Aegean to its 
own advantage. Turkey, on the other hand, declared the same breadth in 1964, since 
in the 1930s it did not perceive Greek extension, and the intention behind it, as a 
challenge to itself. Although Turkey did not object to the extension of Greek 
territorial waters then, not all states were content about this Greek decision. An 
objector in 1936, in this respect, was the UK, which favored a limit of three n.m. 
until the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Conference.49  
The first dispute between Greece and Turkey related to the width of the 
territorial sea in the Aegean emerged in 1964 as Turkey decided to extend its 
territorial sea to six n.m.. Although it was practicing the same width in the Aegean 
Sea, Greece objected to the Turkish decision with the claim that six n.m. of Turkish 
territorial waters would impede fishing rights of Greece in the Aegean Sea.50 By the 
                                                 
49 Yücel Acer. The Aegean Maritime Disputes and International Law, (Wiltshire: Ashgate, 2003), p. 30.  
50 Yücel Acer. (2003), p. 30. It should also be noted that Turkey, while extending its territorial waters 
and also claiming a fisheries zone beyond its territorial waters, in the commentary of the related 
territorial waters law of 1964, emphasized that if third states have acquired rights related to fishing, 
then this sort of a dispute will be settled between Turkey and the related state. (Yüksel İnan. Devletler 
Hukuku Bakımından Kıyı Suları Balıkçılığı ve Sorunları, (Ankara: Ankara İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler 
Akademisi Yayınları No.96, 1976), p. 20). 
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 early 1970s, Greece changed its stance and started to pronounce the possibility of 
further extension of Greek territorial sea. 
Greece, after it signed the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982, to which 
Turkey is still not a signatory, claimed that it has the right to extend its territorial 
waters up to twelve n.m.. It is also important to note that following the Greek 
ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention in 1995 and Greece’s declaration of its 
intention to extend its territorial waters up to twelve n.m. once again, Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (TGNA) on 8 June 1995 enacted a resolution related to this 
possible extension of Greek territorial waters, which indicated that such an act would 
be perceived as casus belli (reason for war). This decision stated that: 
 
While hoping that the Greek Government shall not decide to extend its 
territorial sea in the Aegean beyond the present six miles limit, which in 
turn would ruin the equilibrium established by the Lausanne Peace 
Treaty, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, has decided to grant the 
Turkish Government all powers, including those that may be deemed 
necessary in the military field, for safeguarding and defending the vital 
interests of Turkey in such eventuality. The Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey has also decided to announce this to the Greek and world 
public opinion in a spirit of friendship.51 
 
This TGNA resolution is an indication of the firm objection of the Turkish State 
against any other attempt to change the so-called equilibrium in the Aegean Sea.52 
Consequently, Greece did not change the width of its territorial sea but indicated that 
it reserved the right to do so in the future. So, with this specific statement, Greece 
made sure that it did not renounce its rights anyhow, and emphasized that in 
                                                 
51 Taken from the unofficial translation of TGNA Declaration, 121st Session, 8 June 1995. For the 
complete text of the unofficial translation, see Appendix G. 
52 However, it should also be reminded that the so-called status quo in the Aegean had already been 
changed in 1936 when Greece extended the breadth of its territorial sea to six n.m., which Turkey did 
not oppose at the time. For further details, see İnan and Acer, (2004), pp. 132-136. 
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 accordance with its national strategy, Greece shall be the only party to decide when 
and how it shall exercise these rights.53  
Since these arguments lay out the very basis of the dispute, in the coming 
section, first the claims of the parties on the Aegean case and their legal positions 
regarding the dispute will be clarified, and following this, further Greek and Turkish 
arguments on the issue and practices of the two states related to the dispute as well as 
codification attempts will be explored. 
 
 
3.1. Claims and Legal Bases of the Parties on the Dispute 54 
 
3.1.1. Claims of the Parties 
 
The key divergence between Greece and Turkey in their evaluation of the 
Aegean case(s) is that Greece does not officially accept any of the issues enumerated 
by Turkey, except the delimitation of the continental shelf, as a genuine and 
legitimate dispute. Therefore, Greece considers the other issues as “unilateral 
Turkish claims in the Aegean”, and this constitutes the very basis of the absence of a 
solution regarding the Aegean problems. According to the Greek approach,  
 
The only legitimate dispute that needs to be settled between Greece and 
Turkey in the Aegean is the delimitation of the Aegean continental 
shelf. On this topic, Greece has repeatedly invited Turkey to the 
negotiation table in order for the two sides to agree to a “compromis”55 
                                                 
53 Tullio Treves, (ed.). The Law of the Sea: The European Union and Its Member States, (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), p. 565. 
54 All the claims in this section that is considered to be the official view of the parties are taken from 
the foreign ministry websites of Greece and Turkey; www.mfa.gr and www.mfa.gov.tr . 
55 The reason for Greece in inviting Turkey for negotiating to agree on a compromise agreement for 
the referral of the continental shelf dispute to the ICJ is to create the legal basis of the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ. As can be remembered from the judgement of the ICJ on 19 December 1976, related to the 
Aegean Continental Shelf Case, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case, based 
on positive legal norms that are binding between Greece and Turkey. Greece, in its application, based 
its claim on the 1928 Geneva Final Act but it had reservations, and the case failed due to these 
reservations. In addition, during the oral proceedings the Court challenged why Greece did not base its 
claim of jurisdiction on the 30 October 1930 Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and 
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 for the referral of the dispute to the International Court of Justice. 
Turkey has repeatedly turned down Greece's invitation. 
Beyond this, all other matters at times termed “Aegean disputes” by 
Turkey consist exclusively of arbitrary claims against Greek 
sovereignty put forth by Turkey in defiance of international law and 
agreements.56  
 
On the other hand, Turkish officials argue that the challenges posed by 
Greece to change the status quo in the Aegean that was established by the 1923 
Lausanne Peace Treaty and the Greek perception of the Aegean as a Greek sea 
constitutes the primary source of tension between Greece and Turkey within the said 
area. In this context, according to the Turkish perception, the actual source of Greek–
Turkish conflicts is the unilateral acts of Greece such as its efforts to extend the 
Greek territorial waters beyond the present width of six n.m., the re-militarization of 
the Eastern Aegean islands, and Greece’s practice of ten n.m. of "national air space" 
over its territorial waters of six n.m..  
 Thus, in general terms, the Greek approach is that there is no issue between 
Greece and Turkey other than the continental shelf dispute, whereas for Turkey the 
main issue is the one related to the extension of the territorial sea. In this context, to 
be able to come to an agreement on “the” Aegean dispute, Greece suggests that the 
continental shelf dispute should be brought before the ICJ. Dissenting from the 
Greek proposal, Turkish officials argue that the issues, first of all, should be solved 
by applying methods of pacific settlement of disputes, which are enumerated in 
                                                                                                                                          
Arbitration regarding peaceful settlement of the disputes, including legal arbitration and referral of the 
disputes to the PCIJ. Greece as a defense raised the argument that the procedure described in the 
agreement was too long and complex. However, in reality, Article 4 of the said agreement can be 
considered as the main obstacle before Greece, which underlines that disputes related to the domestic 
jurisdiction and sovereignty disputes were excluded in the case of differences of opinion related to 
those that the PCIJ would be the organ to decide upon the issue. For the texts of the agreement in 
Turkish and English, see Düstur [Compilation of Turkish Legal Rules] III, vol. 12, p. 73 or 125 
League of Nations Treaty Series (LoNTS), 9. 
56 Taken from: www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey. 
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 Article 33/1 of the UN Charter under the scope of Chapter VI titled “Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes,”57 since issues are more than one.58 
Turkish officials underline that unless the conditions related to the disputes 
such as the delimitation issues or the extent of the Greek territorial sea are clarified, 
it is not really possible to bring any of the disputes before the ICJ. For instance, 
without knowing the extent of the Greek territorial waters it will not be possible to 
define the areas of continental shelf pertaining to that state, since depending on the 
breadth of the territorial waters the amount of the areas that will be subject to 
delimitation will also change. For this reason, Turkey prefers to seek a solution to the 
disputes by means of bilateral talks built on mutual consent. In this respect, Çağatay 
Erciyes emphasizes the known Turkish official policy that Turkey does not refrain 
from going to the ICJ, if the said means fail to provide a settlement despite efforts 
displayed in good faith. Nonetheless, according to the Turkish official view, for 
Greece and Turkey to be able to bring the case before the Court, first of all certain 
means related to settlement of these issues have to be clarified.59  
 
 
3.1.2. Legal Basis of the Arguments of Greece and Turkey 
 
While making the arguments indicated in the previous section (3.1.1.), both 
states refer to the same document, namely to the United Nations Convention on the 
                                                 
57 Article 33, paragraph one of the UN Charter states that “The parties to any dispute, the continuance 
of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all, 
seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort 
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” 
58 With regard to the application of methods of pacific settlement of disputes, Turkey has several note 
verbales, some of which are as follows: Memorandum of Understanding between Greece and Turkey, 
dated 27 May 1988, Athens; Statement by Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz on Turkish-Greek Relations, 
dated 24 March 1996. Two other note verbales for similar purposes are dated 12 February 1998, 11 
March 1998, and there are references to the ICJ as a means of settlement, in these notes as well, 
(especially in the latter). For details on the enumerated note verbales, see Section 3.3. 
59 Interview with the Director of the Maritime Affairs of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, by the author, 
29 December 2003, Ankara. 
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 Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for their claims. Greece claims that it has a right to 
extend its territorial sea to twelve n.m. based on Article 3 of the 1982 Convention,60 
which states that “Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial 
sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve n.m., measured from baselines determined in 
accordance with this Convention”.61 On the other hand, while objecting to a possible 
extension of Greek territorial waters more than six n.m., Turkey refers to Article 300 
of the Convention, which states that “States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the 
obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction 
and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute 
an abuse of right.62  In this respect, Turkey argues that since there exist special 
circumstances63 in the Aegean Sea, a possible Greek extension of its territorial waters 
more than six n.m. would be an abuse of rights as outlined by Article 300 of the 
Convention. In this context, when results of the possible Greek exercise of twelve 
n.m. territorial waters in the Aegean are studied, the table below emerges:  
 
TABLE 1. Changes in the percentages of territorial sea in the Aegean in accordance with the 
width of Greek territorial waters 64 
 
 
Territorial Waters 6 n.m. Greek territorial waters 
12 n.m. Greek 
territorial waters 
Turkish territorial waters 7,5 % 8,7 % 
Greek territorial waters 43,5 % 71,5 % 
International waters (High seas) 49 % 19,7 % 
                                                 
60 For further information, see Article 3 (Breadth of the territorial sea), Article 33 (Contiguous zone), 
Article 121 (Regime of islands), Article 122 (Definition), Article 123 (Co-operation of States 
bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas), and Article 300 (Good faith and abuse of rights) of the 
Convention in Appendix C. 
61 Taken from www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. 
62 Taken from www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. 
63  Turkey from the very first conference of the UNCLOS had reservations on certain general 
expressions of the Convention. This is why Turkey throughout the conferences underlined the vitality 
of the special circumstances. In this context, special circumstances of the Aegean Sea and the Turkish 
attitude during the meetings of the UNCLOS as well as its reservations on the 1982 Convention will 
be studied in detail in the coming sections. 
64 The figures are taken from www.mfa.gov.tr. 
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  In the current situation, Turkey has an exit area of 121 km long from its 
coastline, and it can have access to the high seas of the Aegean from five different 
points. However, if the limit of Greek territorial waters is extended to twelve n.m. 
then the Turkish area of exit will decrease to 19 km and access to the high seas will 
be from three different spots.65 In the light of these findings, Turkish officials argue 
that a practice of twelve n.m. of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean Sea will be 
an abuse of rights, which will have highly disadvantageous consequences for 
Turkey. Thus, Turkey asserts that such an exercise is unacceptable, and that it can 
even be considered illegal. In this respect, Turkish officials emphasize that the 
settlement of this dispute, on the basis of non-extension of Greek territorial waters 
beyond its present limits, is a sine qua non (essential condition) clause for the 
resolution of all Aegean disputes.66 
In this context, if the legal positions of the two states are evaluated, it can be 
stated that Greece claims that it has an absolute right to establish the breadth of its 
territorial sea to a limit not exceeding twelve n.m. depending on the rule provided in 
Article 3 of the UNCLOS. Moreover, the Greeks point out the fact that this rule of 
the UNCLOS does not necessarily make a reference to areas with special 
circumstances where states should keep the breadth of their territorial waters at an 
equitable level. In this respect, no area, including the Aegean Sea is considered to be 
an exception for Greece. Besides, another Greek argument is that since the right to 
determine the width of the territorial sea is a sovereign and unilateral right vested 
with the coastal state, Greece does not necessarily have to discuss this issue with 
Turkey. “Therefore, [according to Greece] any objection on the part of a third State 
                                                 
65 The information is provided from Çağatay Erciyes during the interview. 
66 Interview with Çağatay Erciyes, by the author. For further details, also see, Yüksel İnan and Sertaç 
Başeren, “The Troubled Situation of the Aegean Territorial Waters” in Hellenic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 
1996, pp. 55-68. 
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 to the choice of the coastal State in this respect - provided, of course, that the breadth 
adopted does not exceed the 12-mile limit - would be unsubstantiated.”67 
With respect to Greek claims, Turkey accepts that the declaration of the width 
of the territorial sea is a unilateral action. Nevertheless, Turkey is the other coastal 
state of the Aegean and consequently it has vital interests in this area. For this reason, 
Turkish officials outline the set of principles that should be adopted in bilateral 
correspondence with Greece as follows:  
 
a. The Aegean is a common sea between Turkey and Greece. 
b. Both countries should respect each other’s legitimate rights and 
vital interests.  
c. These freedoms at the high seas and the air space above it, which at 
present both coastal states as well as third countries enjoy, should 
not be impaired. 
d. Any acquisition of new maritime areas should be based on mutual 
consent and should be fair and equitable. 68 
 
Moreover, Turkey objects to the Greek claim that the right to extend 
territorial waters to a limit of twelve n.m. is an absolute one, especially in an area 
like the Aegean Sea. Thus, Turkey argues that the validity of a unilateral declaration 
on the limit of the territorial sea must be in conformity with the relevant norms of 
international law. In this respect, Turkey claims that special circumstances in the 
Aegean Sea should be taken into consideration while determining the breadth of the 
territorial sea in this area so as not to cause an abuse of rights.  
Prior to making references to the judgments of the international courts 
regarding special circumstances, current general applications of the two states should 
be studied. When reference is made to the practices of the two states related to the 
breadth of the territorial sea in the Aegean, it can be observed that Turkish 
application is six n.m. whereas it is twelve n.m. in the Mediterranean Sea and in the 
                                                 
67 Taken from www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/. 
68 Taken from www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/EuropeanCountries/EUCountries/Greece. 
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 Black Sea. Thus, Turkey practices different width of territorial waters on different 
seas. 
 
In 1964, Turkey’s territorial waters were declared as six nautical miles 
(Art. 1/1) by the <<Territorial Waters Law>> (Law No: 476). Yet, 
Turkey also reserved the right on the basis of reciprocity, to apply 
broader territorial sea limits to those countries that accept and apply 
broader limits (Art. 2). […] Given the changes in the law of the sea, the 
various views of the states and also  some of Turkey’s draft article 
resolutions Ankara submitted to the Third UN Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, denounced this law (No. 476) and accepted on 20 May 1982 
a new <<Territorial Waters Law>> (Law No: 2674).  
Since May 1982, Turkey has applied this law, which also accepts a 
territorial sea of six nautical miles (Art. 1/1). The same law also gave 
the government the power to declare broader territorial waters in 
particular seas, where all circumstances justified such an act and where 
the principles of equity are not compromised (Art. 1/3). 
The Turkish Government, taking into consideration this particular 
provision of the law, declared by a decree (Decree No: 8/4747 dated 
May 29, 1982) that it would continue to apply a territorial sea of twelve 
nautical miles in the Black Sea and also in the Mediterranean.69 
 
Greece, on the other hand, practices the same breadth of territorial waters in 
all its seas, including the Ionian Sea. Since Greece does not want to practice different 
breadths of territorial sea it cannot yet extend its territorial sea to twelve n.m. even in 
the Mediterranean. Although it was in favor of three n.m. as the width of territorial 
sea during the proceedings of the La Haye Codification Conference, on 17 
September 1936 by Law No. 230 Greece extended its territorial waters to six n.m.. It 
should also be noted that during the La Haye Conference Turkey was in favor of a 
limit of six n.m..70 
According to the Turkish official perspective since there are almost a total 
number of 3000 islands and islets in the Aegean Sea71, and since some of these 
islands and islets are too close to the Turkish coasts, whereas such circumstances are 
                                                 
69 İnan and Başeren. (1996), pp. 57-58. 
70 İnan and Başeren. (1996), p. 59. 
71 Aside from the general tendency, Yüksel İnan and Yücel Acer refer to the number of islands and 
islets as around 1800 in their article entitled The Aegean Disputes. 
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 present neither in the Black Sea nor in the Mediterranean Sea, the Turkish 
application of different limits of territorial sea is not an inconsistent one. However, 
an application which is considered to be an inconsistent one, according to the 
Turkish point of view is the Greek practice of ten n.m. of airspace.  
 
 
3.1.3. A “Double” Arrangement of the Territorial Sea – The Greek Airspace Issue  
 
In this context, a brief reference should be made to this issue since part of 
this subject falls under the scope of this study, and helps to clarify the underlying 
reasons for the absence of a peaceful solution to the bilateral disputes between 
Greece and Turkey. Despite applying the same breadth in all its seas, currently, 
Greece applies two different breadths of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea; for 
general purposes it has six n.m. territorial waters, and for the regulation of aviation 
and air policing, a ten mile territorial sea established by a decree in 1931.72 Thus, 
Greece has two different limits of territorial sea, which is also the contemporary 
practice that constitutes a point of disagreement between Greece and Turkey.  
Since 1975, Turkey argues against this practice of ten n.m. of Greek airspace 
and as a display of its objection, it started to penetrate the Greek national airspace 
within the limits of 6 to 10 n.m.. This, at times, causes considerable tension between 
the two states and “dogfights” take place. An important point that is raised by the 
Greek officials regarding this very case is that prior to 1975, Turkey had not made 
any reservation regarding the double arrangement of Greek territorial waters. Thus, 
                                                 
72 Taken from www.mfa.gr, as stated in the Greek Foreign Ministry website: “For the time being, 
Greece has fixed the lateral limits of its territorial sea in two different ways: a 6-mile territorial sea, 
for general purposes, established by Law in 1936, with a 10-mile territorial sea, established by Decree 
in 1931 for aviation and air policing purposes. Following this arrangement, the lateral limits of 
Greece's national airspace were legally defined at 10 n.m., with reference to the delimitation of a 
special zone of territorial sea of 10 n.m., serving the requirements of aviation and air police.” 
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 this “double” arrangement of Greece in its territorial waters did not face any 
opposition at the beginning. 
 
After the coming into force of Annex 4 of the Chicago Convention 
concerning Aeronautical Charts, the first aeronautical charts of ICAO, 
published in 1949, were based on the CINA charts. Included in their 
second publication, in 1955, were new aeronautical charts that Greece 
published with a clear description of its national airspace boundaries as 
extending to 10 n.m.. It must be noted that the corresponding Turkish 
aeronautical charts also include the boundaries of the Hellenic national 
airspace in 10 n.m.. The limits of the Athinai FIR were determined, 
and the relevant Air Navigation European Plan Chart was approved, 
during the Regional Air Navigation Meetings of Paris (1952) and 
Geneva (1958), based on the external limits of the territorial waters and 
boundaries of the adjacent FIR's of the neighbouring States. Turkey 
participated in these Regional Meetings without reserve, concerning 
the 10 n.m. lateral limits of the Hellenic national airspace.73  
 
In this context, references made to Greek aeronautical charts in the 1958 Regional 
Meeting and the notification of these to ICAO in 1955 did not face any Turkish 
objection. Thus, Greece argues against the current negative Turkish position towards 
the Greek practice continuing since 1970s, as Turkey had long accepted the double 
arrangement of Greek territorial sea practice. It is valid that Turkey prior 1975 did 
not oppose to that practice either due to lack of interest on the issue and its 
perception of Greece at the time or due to its past foreign policy objectives.74  
However, whether Turkey had objected to this prior to 1975 or not, Greece’s 
application of the double limits of territorial sea does not really follow international 
law. As Greece indicates (in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs website while explaining 
the case of the “Greek Territorial Waters and national airspace” from its point of 
view), “In accordance with International Law (Articles 1 and 2 of the Chicago 
                                                 
73 Taken from www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/. 
74 It should be reminded that in the 1930s, especially till mid-1950s Greek-Turkish relations were 
considerably well, peaceful and friendly. The period between 1930 and 1950s, can be considered as 
the best times of Greek-Turkish neighborly relations of the modern, Republican Turkish state. 
However, with the outbreak of the Cyprus issue the peaceful and friendly atmosphere between the two 
states started to turn into a tense one, and the Turkish operation on the island of Cyprus constituted the 
final crossroads. Thus, from this day on, also the perception of the two states towards each other had 
also changed in an exceptionally negative way.    
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 Convention of 1944 on Civil Aviation) the sovereign airspace of a state is the 
airspace above its territory and its territorial waters.”75 Since Greece exercises a limit 
4 n.m. wider than its territorial sea, it does not follow the definition of Articles 1 and 
2 of the Chicago Convention, and contradicts with its very own reference. Greek 
officials indicate that  
 
The reason for this "double" arrangement was Greece's policy of 
facilitating the freedom of navigation at that time. Indeed, in 1931, 
quite in conformity with international law, Greece could have created a 
10-nautical mile territorial zone of general application. However, 
Greece refrained from doing so out of liberalism towards maritime 
navigation.76 
 
In light of this, two evaluations of the Greek statement above seem necessary. First, 
it should be reminded that in 1931 the extension of territorial sea up to twelve n.m. 
was not yet accepted and this was not a general principle practiced by states. In this 
context, the phrase “quite in conformity with international law” does not really 
reflect the actual situation. Moreover, Greece, when it declared 10 n.m. of airspace, 
was practicing only three n.m. of territorial sea, and it was not until 1936 that Greece 
extended its territorial sea to six n.m.. 77  Secondly, it should be underlined that 
conditions in the Aegean Sea, which made Greece practice two different 
arrangements, have not changed since 1931. Moreover, either as a means of 
justification or as a solid reason, Greece, with this very statement highlighted that 
there are circumstances which led Athens to practice a different width of territorial 
                                                 
75 Taken from www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/. 
76 Taken from www.mfa.gr. In line with the quotation, it can be presumed that this is a confession 
related to the decrease of the Aegean airspace contrary to the interests of third state vessels, 
particularly to military, state and even to civil vessels, since aircrafts are permitted to fly in those 
zones (areas) with special permission of the related sovereign state. As it is well-known, international 
law does not ipso-facto recognise the right of innocent passage from the airspaces of states.  
77 As it can be observed from the records of the First Committee of the UN Conference of the Law of 
the Sea (24 February to 27 April 1958), the Greek state had no intention, whatsoever to extend its 
territorial sea to twelve n.m. in the Aegean Sea. This attitude was expressed by the Greek delegate 
Kripsis during the meetings, and it was not until the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea that 
Greece started to advocate a general limit of 12 n.m. to exercise as the breadth of the territorial sea. 
For the exact statement of the Greek delegate Kripsis, see p. 48, paragraph 2. 
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 waters and the airspace above it in the Aegean Sea, so as not to cause a hampering 
impact on the freedom of navigation. From this point, it seems appropriate to 
continue with focusing on special circumstances in the Aegean. Therefore, in the 
coming section the geography of the Aegean Sea and its primary characteristics will 
be outlined.  
 
 
3.2. Special Circumstances in the Aegean Sea 
 
The Aegean is a common sea between Greece and Turkey, in which both 
states have vital interests, and thus, the unique characteristics of the Aegean 
constitute the basic source of bilateral disputes between the two states. In this 
respect, it is highly important to focus on the elements that make the Aegean Sea an 
area where geographic features require utmost attention. With regard to the special 
characteristics of the Aegean, Feldman states that: 
 
The political geography of the Aegean Sea is unique. This body of 
water has been described as a semi enclosed sea measuring 
approximately 400 miles long by 100 miles wide and bordered by the 
coasts of two states – Greece and Turkey. This small space includes 
approximately 3000 different islands and islets, mostly under Greek 
sovereignty. A few islands are large. Many are small. Most important, a 
number of Greek islands of various sizes lie in close proximity to the 
coast of Turkey. The situation of these islands has long been recognized 
by scholars and governments as the prototypical “special circumstance” 
for purposes of maritime boundary delimitation.78 
 
In this context, the coasts of Greece and Turkey surround the Aegean, and no other 
state has direct access to this sea. However, due to its geographic location, the 
Aegean constitutes a maritime link between the littoral states of the Mediterranean 
                                                 
78 Mark B. Feldman. “International Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Law and Practice from the Gulf 
of Maine to the Aegean Sea” in Aegean Issues: Problems-Legal and Political Matrix, Seyfi Taşhan, 
(ed.), (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1995), p. 14.  
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 Sea and the littorals of the Black Sea.79 Based on this fact, it can be claimed that the 
Aegean is a vital area for international navigation, especially for the coastal states of 
the Black Sea, and this reality, inevitably, draws the attention of these states as well 
as other states80 that do use the Turkish Straits for international transportation to this 
issue and thus to the extent of territorial waters in the area.  
The importance of the Aegean with regard to international navigation is 
referred to, at times, both by Greece and Turkey. For instance, during the First 
Committee meetings of the UN Conference of the Law of the Sea, which took place 
between 24 February and 27 April 1958, the Greek delegate Kripsis indicated that “If 
Greece extends its territorial sea to twelve nautical miles, which, according to Article 
3 of the Commission’s draft, would not be contrary to international law, it would be 
closing the whole of the Aegean Sea to the international community”.81  In this 
statement, the Greek admission is quite clear that a further extension of the territorial 
waters in the Aegean would highly impede international maritime navigation,82 and 
this would mean, without doubt, abuse of a right. For that reason, the distinctiveness 
of the Aegean Sea in terms of international navigation is a criterion that should be 
taken into consideration when deciding on the breadth of the territorial sea in the 
region.  
 Another characteristic of the Aegean that Turkey is highly concerned with is 
the number and location of islands, islets and rocks in the area despite the relatively 
                                                 
79 Yücel Acer. (2003), p. 4. 
80 Some of the states that use the Straits most can be listed, according to the number of passage from 
the Straits of Istanbul and Çanakkale from 2000 to 2003, as follows: Malta (43,878), Russian 
Federation (33,848), Ukraine (27,143), Cambodia (19,485), Syria (14,557), Panama (12,576), Greece 
(10431), Saint Vincent (9031), Republic of Cyprus (8058), Antigua and Barbuda (6741), Liberia 
(6396), Bulgaria (6280), etc. In addition to the listed third flag states, Turkey due to being the riparian 
to the Straits obviously is the one that uses this route the highest, which as a figure corresponds to 
87,978 times in four years. The figures are a compilation of the data provided in Rapport Annuel sur 
le Mouvement des Navires a Travers les Detroits Turcs for years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.  
81 İnan and Acer. (2004), end note 46, p. 151. For further details, see İnan 1976, pp. 43-44. 
82 This fact was also expressed in another Greek statement that was referred to as a direct quotation on 
page 46 and footnote 77.  
 48  
 narrow size of the sea. Most of these islands belong to Greece and some of them are 
too close to the vicinity of the Turkish coasts. In this respect, the distinct 
geographical characteristics83 of these islands constitute the core of Aegean maritime 
disputes.84  
 
First of all, due to their large number, the Greek islands constitute a 
very significant portion of the total coastal length of Greece. They have 
around 7,500 km coastal length in total. On the other hand, Turkey’s 
Aegean islands have a mere 679 km coastal length. […] A 
considerable number of the Aegean islands are very small islets and 
rocks with no human habitation. Some of them such as Crete, Evvia, 
Rhodes, Lesvos, Chios, Limnos and Samos are, however, quite 
sizeable and have a significant population. The rest of the Aegean 
islands are again different in terms of size, ranging from 10 km2 to 
400km2. 85 
 
Due to the above stated complicated geographic structure inherent in the area, 
Turkey has certain and vital concerns about the breadth of the territorial sea. Thus, it 
is not, in any way, in favor of any further extension of the Greek territorial waters in 
the Aegean Sea.  
Specific Turkish concerns related to a limit of twelve n.m. in the Aegean arise 
from expected consequences which can be enumerated as follows.86 First of all, 
“such an action will turn the Aegean into a Greek Sea to the detriment of Turkey's 
vital and legitimate interests”. In this context, if extension is realized, Turkey will be 
practically locked up to its own territorial waters in the Aegean. This, also, will 
highly reduce the proportion of the high seas and thus, preclude other states from 
                                                 
83 The length of the coasts of the coastal states, the nature of the sea such as being too shallow, and/or 
the presence of rocks, islets and islands highly close to the shore, (which will raise claims for applying 
straight baselines), the configurated nature of the coasts and possibilities to apply straight baselines 
from the outer edges of those configurations, etc. are accepted as special circumstances according to 
international practice, international law and also according to the practice of the ICJ. 
84 Yücel Acer. (2003), p. 4. 
85 Yücel Acer. (2003), p. 5. 
86  All the points raised within this paragraph, including the interpretation of the possible 
consequences, are taken from 
www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/EuropeanCountries/EUCountries/Greece/GreeceLinks/
Territorial_Waters.htm. 
 49  
 benefiting in terms of economic, military, navigational or other purposes. Secondly, 
“Turkey's access to the high seas will be blocked and its Aegean coast will be 
encircled by Greek territorial waters [and] Turkey's access from its west shores to the 
international waters (high seas) of the Aegean and similarly from the Aegean to the 
Mediterranean will almost be curtailed.” Thirdly, “Turkey's military, economic and 
scientific interests will be seriously jeopardized”, and Turkey will no more be able to 
conduct military trainings in the Aegean Sea. Moreover, Turkish naval units will be 
obliged to use the Greek territorial waters for passage from the Aegean to the 
Mediterranean or from the Mediterranean to the Aegean. This will also affect the 
military aircraft and “Aegean bound flights will not be possible and Mediterranean 
flights will be subject to Greek permission”. If Greece starts to practice twelve n.m. 
limit of territorial waters, this will also hamper Turkey’s activities in the Aegean Sea 
such as scientific research, fishing and sponge-diving in areas beyond the Turkish 
territorial sea, and Turkey will have to get the approval of Greece since it will have 
no legal right to carry out such activities without Greek consent. Finally, according to 
the Turkish point of view, “Greece will gain unjustified advantage in delimitation of 
other maritime jurisdiction areas”, which will, in return, affect the settlement of the 
other related Aegean disputes such as the delimitation of the continental shelf, the 
exclusive economic zone and the contiguous zone. Thus, the overall Turkish 
argument is that a further extension of the Greek territorial sea is not only destined to 
have results regarding the rights of international navigation, but also will have other 
unpredictable outcomes.  
Due to reasons above, the extension of the Greek territorial waters more than 
six n.m. is highly unacceptable for Turkey although Greece has a right to do so 
emanating from Article 3 of the UNCLOS. Moreover, as far as Turkey is concerned 
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 the special circumstances cannot be disregarded if settlement of the Aegean disputes 
is to be achieved, and the rights of the states established by international law should 
be practiced in good faith in order not to cause an abuse of rights, which is based on 
Article 300 of the UNCLOS.87 Since the clauses of the UNCLOS are not clear 
enough about special circumstances, and interpretation of the parties vary, a direct 
reference to the practice of the ICJ seems viable. In this context, an overview of the 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case will be provided to refer to an actual practice of 
states where the ICJ came to a judgment by taking into account the special 
circumstances that exist.  
The ICJ in its judgment dated 18 December 1951, which dealt with the 
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case88, emphasized that it is necessary to consider the 
special characteristics of the concerned area while determining the extent of 
territorial waters. As a response to British claims, Norway argued that the coast of 
the mainland is of a very distinctive configuration and that it does not constitute a 
clear dividing line between the land and sea. This constitutes special circumstances 
when evaluated within the scope of international law and its practice. Also, it is quite 
similar to the situation in the Aegean and thus comprises a supporting case for the 
Turkish stand.  
Throughout its proceedings, the Court noted that the principle of straight 
base-line will apply in the case of the Norwegian coast, and added that it has been in 
practice without any objections from other states.89 The Court also emphasized that 
unilateral practices of a state do not constitute acceptable legal norms of international 
                                                 
87 See the Greek claims regarding Article 3 of the UNCLOS and the Turkish counter arguments on 
this with reference to Article 300, on p. 40, paragraph 1. 
88 The case questions the legality of the Royal Norwegian Decree of 1935 upon the commencement of 
procedures by the UK Government on 28 September 1949. The case, in general terms, deals with the 
fisheries zone, territorial sea, special characteristics of the Norwegian coast and baselines for the 
determination of the points for territorial waters, as well as internal waters. 
89 This method consists of selecting the appropriate points on the low-water mark and drawing straight 
base-lines between them. 
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 law. “In this connection, [according to the Court], the practice of states does not 
justify the formulation of any general rule of law.”90 This can also be accepted as an 
important legal point of view supporting the Turkish argument, especially regarding 
the airspace issue. The Court further observed that the system of delimitation was 
consistently applied by Norway and this system did not face any objection by other 
states. Thus, it can be deduced that when a state practice is consistent, it not only 
creates acquired rights but also acquiescence of a norm by third parties.91  
In line with previous statements, the Court also expressed that “the 
application of the system of delimitation by the Norwegian authorities was consistent 
and uninterrupted since 1869 until the dispute arose [in 1933]”.92 This stance of the 
Court might affect the Greek-Turkish case related to the airspace issue, which might 
have negative consequences for Turkey, since Turkey had neither challenged nor 
opposed the 10 n.m. of Greek airspace from 1931 to 1975. 93  State practice is 
accepted by international courts as legal evidence, which is in principle reflected in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.94 However, with 
regard to the extension of the Greek territorial waters to more than six n.m., Turkey 
has been a persistent objector of further extension. Thus, unlike the case in the 
airspace issue, Turkey has long been advocating the preservation of the present six 
                                                 
90 Judgment of the Court, Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), p. 19.  
91 It should also be noted that there are cases where international tribunals, for certain disputes, had to 
take into account state practice and ruled in favor of the state that displayed consistent and unopposed 
state practice. A few examples are the legal status of Eastern Greenland between Denmark and 
Norway (5 April 1933), the case related to the sovereignty over certain frontier land between Belgium 
and the Netherlands (20 June 1959) and the dispute over sovereignty on Pulau Litigan and Pulau 
Sitigan between Indonesia and Malaysia (17 December 2002). 
92 Yücel Acer. (2003), p. 26. 
93 One of the main causes of this might be that the two states are members of the NATO since 1952, 
and all the NATO documents limit the airspace of member states to their territorial waters. For further 
information, see İnan and Acer. (2004), pp. 125-157.  
94 For Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties which deals with the general 
rule of interpretation, see Appendix I.  
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 n.m. limit since there exist special circumstances, which make things quite 
complicated in the Aegean Sea.  
In this respect, from the Turkish point of view, an extension of Greek 
territorial waters to more than six n.m. in the Aegean Sea will obviously be 
disregarding the special circumstances inherent in the area. Thus, such an act would 
cause inequity, and this will bring about an abuse of rights for the states that have 
rights in the said area. Article 15 of the UNCLOS also makes references to the 
historic title and special circumstances when “delimitation of the territorial sea 
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts” is in consideration.95  
Since both Greece and Turkey refer to the same document, namely to the 
UNCLOS, as a legal source for their claims on the Aegean Sea, a reference to the 
formation of this Convention and to the prior codification activities seem beneficial 
to understand the evolution of the views of the parties with regard to the extent of the 
territorial sea.  
 
 
3.3. Codification Activities and Bilateral Efforts of the Parties  
 
 The first attempt to achieve codified rules of international law took place in 
1920, with the consideration of the Committee preparing the statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice that codification of international law would be 
beneficial for the international community. To this end, in 1924, the General 
                                                 
95 The article reads as follows: “Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, 
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its 
territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The 
above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other 
special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance 
therewith.” According to the Turkish official view, this article reflects the principles for delimitation 
in the Aegean. 
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 Assembly of the League of Nations formed a sub-commission to decide on the 
subjects that were ready to be codified. Some of these subjects were related to 
international law of the sea such as the territorial sea, the legal status of commercial 
ships, management of sea sources and piracy. Therefore, the La Haye Conference 
can be accepted as the first attempt to codify rules of international law of the sea as 
well. This was a conference composed of 47 participant states that convened between 
13 March 1930 and 12 April 1930 in La Haye. However, this conference failed to 
achieve its objective, especially concerning the codification of rules of the 
international law of the sea, due to absence of agreement between the parties.  
In this conference, mainly the breadth of the territorial sea was tried to be 
determined, however when it was understood that this issue could not be settled, the 
participant states were asked to state their opinions on the territorial sea and 
contiguous zone issues. While answering this question, most states preferred to 
explain their own practices. In this respect, Turkey indicated that it was in favor of a 
contiguous zone outside the territorial sea whereas Greece did not raise any points. 
With respect to the breadth of the territorial sea, Greece expressed that it was in favor 
of three n.m. as a limit. On the other hand, Turkey favored a width of six n.m..96  
As indicated previously, the 1930 La Haye Codification Conference failed to 
achieve concrete rules of law with regard to the international law of the sea. Attempts 
to codify the rules of international law of the sea continued with the First and the 
Second UN Conferences on the International Law of the Sea, and were finalized with 
the conclusion of the UNCLOS. In this context, the next two sections will focus on 
                                                 
96 It should also be noted that the Soviet Union was the only state that claimed 12 n.m. of territorial 
sea as a limit at that time. 
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 approaches of Greece and Turkey during these Conferences as well as outlining 
changes in the stance of Greece concerning the extent of territorial waters.97  
 
 
3.3.1. The Vacillation of Greek Stance throughout the Development of the UNCLOS 
 
 The positions of Greece and Turkey during the UN Conferences on the Law 
of the Sea constitute an important context in defining differences of perceptions 
between the two parties. In this context, firstly, the Greek change of attitude during 
these conferences will be studied while providing a background on the Turkish 
stance. To this end, the initial reference should be made to the first conference of the 
UN for the codification of a law of the sea, which convened between 24 February 
and 27 April 1958.  
Turkey, during this first conference, indicated that it would accept three n.m. 
as the breadth of the territorial sea, however, it also pronounced that if another state 
practiced a wider territorial sea in any of the seas to which Turkey is a riparian, then 
Turkey would also act in the same manner in the concerned area on the basis of 
reciprocity. Similarly, Greece also indicated that it was ready to accept three n.m. of 
territorial waters, although it was practicing a six n.m. limit.98 In this respect, Greece 
was proclaiming that if three n.m. was accepted as the breadth of the territorial sea in 
the Conference, it would also decrease the extent of its territorial sea to three n.m., 
despite the fact that Greece’s food resources are mostly dependent on the sea. While 
explaining its viewpoint, Greece made reference to the Aegean Sea by outlining 
potential outcomes of the extension of the Greek territorial waters to twelve n.m., 
                                                 
97 For further details, see Yüksel İnan. (1976), pp. 34-36.  
98 Yüksel İnan. (1976), p. 43. 
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 and underlined that such an act would hamper freedom of international navigation in 
the area in terms of closing the Aegean Sea to the international community.99    
  In conformity with its proclamation, Greece presented its proposal (A/CONF. 
13/C. 1/L. 136), which suggested a width of three n.m. for the territorial sea.100 Later 
on, Greece withdrew its proposal to support the Italian proposal, which said that the 
coastal states should have the jurisdiction to decide the limit of the territorial sea to 
an extent up to six n.m., however, the territorial sea should not be wider than six 
n.m.101 Turkey, on the other hand, preferred to support Canada’s proposal, which 
also offered a limit up to six n.m. for the territorial sea. In line with this, Turkey cast 
in favor of the Canadian proposal, whereas it cast a negative vote to the common 
proposal of India of Mexico, as well as the proposal of the Soviet Union, which 
offered a limit of territorial waters up to twelve n.m. on different bases.102 Moreover, 
both Greece and Turkey voted in favor of the proposal of the US since the given 
extent of the territorial sea was six n.m..  
 In the course of the conference, none of the proposals achieved the required 
number of positive votes. Therefore, no result concerning the extent of the territorial 
sea and the fisheries zone could be achieved at the end of the conference. This set up 
the basis for the second conference. However, the outcome did not change in this one 
either. The second conference was held between 17 March and 26 April 1960. In 
general terms, neither Greece’s nor Turkey’s positions had changed during the 
conference. For instance, Turkey voted in favor of the proposal of Iceland, the joint 
proposal of Brazil, Cuba and Uruguay, and another joint proposal by the US and 
                                                 
99 For the exact statement, see p. 45, and for further details, see İnan. (1976), p. 44. 
100 Yüksel İnan. (1976), p. 47. 
101 Italy, later on, withdraw its proposal to support the proposal of the US. For further information, see 
Yüksel İnan. (1976), pp. 45-48. 
102 Here, it should be noted that Greece voted against the Canadian proposal since it did not favor 12 
n.m. of exclusive economic zone (EEZ). For further information, see Yüksel İnan. (1976), p. 55. 
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 Canada.103 The official stance of Greece was presented in the speech of Mr. Vlachos 
who said that  
 
his country’s position was the same as it had been at the time of the First 
Conference. His delegation was more convinced than ever that it would 
not be in the interests of the international community to adopt a solution 
which, though it might extend the national territory of each State, would 
increase the responsibilities of coastal States, constitute a permanent 
source of dispute, and check the expansion of world trade. 
About 30 percent of his country’s territory consisted of islands, and it 
had a very long coastline-14.000 nautical miles. It might therefore be 
tempted to advocate an extension of the territorial sea to twelve nautical 
miles, which would enable it to join all its islands by strips of territorial 
sea and so secure control of the Aegean Sea. General considerations, 
however, had strengthened its conviction that the six nautical miles limit 
was a golden rule which should apply both to the territorial sea and to 
the fishing zone, which should coincide with it. 104 
 
 Following the Second Conference, the quest for determining the extent of the 
territorial waters continued also with the Third UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea. The final stage of the conference brought about changes in the positions of the 
states and in line with such change, Greece started to pronounce a fixed and uniform 
limit of twelve n.m. as the breadth of the territorial sea for every state.105 In this 
context the Greek claim was that a general and uniform application of the twelve 
n.m. limit would bring about an indivisible understanding of sovereignty and an 
equal treatment among states, which would also, in return, avoid the practice of 
plural regimes within a system.106 Turkey, on the other hand, indicated that it would 
accept a limit of territorial waters up to twelve n.m. with some reservations.107 The 
renewed Greek position also claimed that the mainland Greece and the Greek islands 
should be considered as an archipelago. In line with this, “Greece asserted the 
                                                 
103 Yüksel İnan. (1976), pp. 67-70. 
104 Deniz Bölükbaşı. Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes, A Unique Case in International Law, 
(London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2004), pp. 129-130. 
105 Greece also proclaimed that it was in favor of an EEZ of up to 200 n.m. outside the territorial 
waters. For further information, see Yüksel İnan. (1976). pp. 149-151.  
106 Yücel Acer. (2003), p. 100. 
107 These reservations will be studied in the coming section.   
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 territorial and political unity of the continental and insular parts of the Greek 
state”.108 However, the Greek proposal was rejected on the basis of the meaning of 
the “archipelagic State” which is defined as “a State constituted wholly by one or 
more archipelagos and may include other islands”.109 Nonetheless, on 10 December 
1982, Greece signed the UNCLOS and made a declaration upon ratification. In this 
declaration, Greece first of all indicated that it reserved its rights stemming from the 
terms of the UNCLOS, so it would not be bound by its current application of six n.m. 
of territorial waters. Moreover, Greece indicated its choice of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as the organ for settlement of disputes that may 
emanate from the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS.110 Thus, Greece once 
again pronounced that it would prefer the judicial settlement of this Court instead of 
an arbitral or a special arbitral tribunal.111  
 Given the overview of the changing position of Greece throughout the 
Conferences, it can be concluded that in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, the Greek officials changed their classical attitude in favor of a twelve n.m. limit 
as the width of the territorial sea. Some argue that this shift was related to the Aegean 
tensions over petroleum issues as well as the Turkish operation to the island of 
Cyprus that took place in the same period, in 1973-1974.112 However, it should also 
                                                 
108 Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), p. 130. 
109 Article 46 of the UNCLOS. For further details see PART IV of the UNCLOS. Similarly, in the 
“Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain”, “the 
Court disregarded Bahrain’s argument that it was entitled to archipelagic state treatment, with 
archipelagic baselines.” For further details, see Jonathan Charney, (ed.). International Maritime 
Boundaries, vol. IV, (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), p. 2849. 
110  For the complete text of the declaration, see Tulio Treves, (ed.) (1997), pp. 565-566 or 
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm . 
111 Article 3 of the Greek declaration states that “Pursuant to article 287 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Government of Hellenic Republic hereby chooses the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI to the 
Convention as the means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Convention.” (Tulio Treves, (ed.). (1997), p. 565). It should also be noted that despite the Greek 
preference of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Greece officially pronounces to submit 
its dispute with Turkey to the ICJ. 
112 Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), p. 137. 
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 not be overlooked that within the practice of twelve n.m. limit, the vast amount of 
territory that would be included within the Greek territorial waters due to the number 
of Greek islands in the Aegean is rather more favorable to Greece than having larger 
high seas portions within the then Greek practice of a six n.m. limit. Whatever the 
nature of the changing Greek position was, this shift constituted a turning point in 
Greek-Turkish relations, since twelve n.m. of territorial waters in the Aegean Sea is 
considered to be an unacceptable option on the part of Turkey. In this respect, in the 
coming section, the reasons as to why Turkey did not sign the UNCLOS will be 
explored for the purpose of underlining the differences in view of the two states. 
 
3.3.2. Reasons of Turkey for Not Signing the UNCLOS 
 
 As indicated previously, Turkey has participated in each and every stage of 
the UN Law of the Sea Conferences. However, it did not sign the Convention since it 
had some reservations stemming from national concerns. These concerns were 
mainly related to the distinct geographical characteristics of certain regions, namely 
of the Aegean Sea. These views were also reflected in the overall evaluation of the 
Third Conference by Turkish officials: 
 
During the deliberations of the Conference, Turkey always stressed that 
the diversity of geographical circumstances was one of the most 
important factors to be taken into consideration in the attainment of this 
objective. On every occasion Turkey expressed the need to establish a 
proper balance between different groups of interests stemming from 
different geographical situations. In our view the final outcome of the 
Conference, as reflected in the text of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, failed to achieve such a balance.113 
 
Thus, this constituted one reason for Turkey to abstain from signing the Convention.  
                                                 
113 Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), p. 178. 
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 Furthermore, Turkey presented a number of proposals for amending some of 
the articles of the Convention’s draft during the meetings of the Second Committee 
of the Third Conference, in which Turkey held Vice Presidential Post of the 
Committee, for the purpose of becoming able to be a part to the Convention. In this 
respect, Turkey had also proposed an amendment permitting reservations on the 
Convention but this proposal was rejected. Upon this, Turkey’s dissatisfaction was 
expressed within the overall evaluation, which is as follows: 
 
The fact that 45 States either voted in favor of that proposal or 
abstained indicated that a considerable number of States had 
difficulties with the Convention. However, in view of the rejection of 
this amendment and in the absence of necessary safeguards for 
Turkey’s vital and legitimate rights and interests, Turkey was 
compelled to vote against the Convention, although it agreed with 
provisions contained in Part XI, on the international area. 
Consequently Turkey finds itself unable to sign the Convention.114  
 
Another obstacle on the part of Turkey, which was underlined in the 
comprehensive statement, presented during the Final Session of the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea was related to the language of the Convention. 
Turkey argued that certain expressions in this document prejudiced the position of 
Turkey with regard to the Convention. Therefore Turkish officials indicated that  
 
The sentence added to paragraph 41, which reads “Throughout the 
preceding eight years of its work the Conference had taken all decisions 
by consensus…” (A/CONF. 62/121), not only creates a misleading 
impression of the proceedings of the Conference but also presents serious 
difficulties for us. It is a well-known fact that at both the formal and 
informal meetings of the Conference the Turkish delegations expressly 
raised objections to a number of articles and submitted amendments 
thereto, and never gave their consent to those which did not 
accommodate the Turkish views. 
Consequently, Turkey regrets that in view of the prejudicial wording 
contained in paragraph 41, it will not be able to sign the Final Act.115 
 
                                                 
114 Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), p. 178. 
115 Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), p. 178. 
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 It should be noted that Turkey has preserved its status of a “persistent objector” for 
the adoption of a limit of twelve n.m. for the territorial sea in semi-enclosed areas.  
 
As far as the semi-enclosed areas are concerned, the amendments 
submitted and the statements made by the Turkish delegations manifest 
Turkey’s consistent and unequivocal refusal to accept the 12-nautical 
miles limit on such seas. In view of the foregoing considerations, the 
12-nautical miles limit cannot be claimed vis à vis Turkey.116 
 
Since the specific Turkish concerns stemmed from the special characteristics 
of the Aegean, Turkey mainly had and still has abstentions on articles 3, 33 and 121 
of the Convention.117 In this context, with reference to Article 3, Turkey claimed that 
“the 12-nautical miles limit for territorial waters has not acquired the character of 
customary international law 118  in cases where the application of such a rule 
constitutes an abuse of right”.119 Thus, according to Turkey, Article 3 is a maximum 
width which should be practiced in line with the principle laid out in Article 300 of 
the UNCLOS related to the “good faith and abuse of rights”. Article 121 of the 
Convention, regulating the regime of islands also was a matter of concern for Turkey 
since it perceived this article as a general one that does not determine the areas to be 
left to the islands during delimitation. Thus, Turkey proposed that the presence of 
islands in an area should be taken into consideration as an element while trying to 
reach a solution within the principle of equity.  
 In light of the reasons presented above, Turkey neither signed nor ratified the 
UNCLOS up to date. However, since Turkey had no intention to wholly disregard 
                                                 
116 Deniz Bölükbaşı. (2004), p. 179. 
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customary international law. 
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 the terms of the Convention, it started to practice some principles laid out in this 
document (e.g. declaration of EEZ in the Black Sea). Since Greece and Turkey have 
major differences in their interpretation of the terms of the UNCLOS, bilateral 
agreements and efforts of the two states become of vital importance for solution of 
disputes. In this respect, it seems viable to continue with the bilateral codification 
activities of Greece and Turkey in the following section, since an international 
codification effort, namely the UNCLOS could not provide, in principle, an efficient 
basis for the resolution of the Aegean disputes.  
 
 
3.3.3. Bilateral Efforts of Greece and Turkey on the Territorial Sea Dispute 
 
The Lausanne Peace Treaty was a document that settled some of the bilateral 
issues between Greece and Turkey. However, the changing international conjuncture 
brought about different issues to the relations of the two countries. As 
aforementioned in the section devoted to the historical background, the outbreak of 
the Cyprus issue affected the future of Greek-Turkish relations negatively. The 
confidence built between the two states in the aftermath of the conclusion of the 
Lausanne Peace Treaty eroded as time passed, especially after the 1970s, and both 
states began to blame each other of hostile acts. Given the circumstances, Greece and 
Turkey displayed efforts to solve their disputes at times. Nevertheless, no solid 
solution could be achieved up to date. In this context, this section will outline these 
failed attempts and provide examples of bilateral efforts.  
Despite the fact that the Lausanne Peace Treaty dealt with vital questions 
concerning Greek-Turkish relations, not all issues were resolved within this treaty. 
Therefore, the two parties continued their efforts at the bilateral level in the 
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 following years. In this respect, an agreement related to the territorial sea was signed 
on 13 November 1926, to delimit the seaward part of the Meritsa River. However, in 
the said year both states were practicing three n.m. of territorial waters and this limit 
was changed to six n.m. in 1936 by Greece and in 1964 by Turkey. Thus, there is 
need for a revision of the limit or a new adjacent delimitation should be sought by 
the parties.120 The 4 January 1932 agreement between Italy and Turkey, governing 
the sovereignty over the islands and islets between the island of Castellorizo and the 
Turkish coasts, to which Greece became a party due to succession according to the 
terms of Article 14 of the 1947 Treaty, can be accepted as another agreement on the 
delimitation of territorial waters in the Aegean and Mediterranean.121  
In general terms, these are the only two agreements on the delimitation of the 
territorial sea between the parties. After the Turkish Peace Operation on Cyprus and 
Turkey’s commencement of research activities in the Aegean continental shelf same 
year, tension between Greece and Turkey reached a peak. These developments were 
followed by the talks of the Foreign Ministers of the two states, Dimitrios Bitsios and 
İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, in May 1975 in Rome. At the end of May, the Prime 
Ministers of Greece and Turkey came together for bilateral talks. In December 1975, 
the Foreign Ministers met in Brussels especially to discuss the Cyprus issue.122 In a 
statement dated 17 April 1976, the Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis 
stated that  
 
Greece has never claimed that the Aegean constitutes a closed Greek 
lake. Greece accepts, as it is natural to accept, that in the Aegean there 
are also international waters as well as certain rights for Turkey. […] 
I would therefore propose to Turkey: first by means of an agreement, 
we should put an end to the armaments race taking place at the expense 
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121 İnan and Başeren. (1996), p. 59. 
122 Hulusi Kılıç, (ed.). Bilateral Agreements, Essential Documents and Declarations between Turkey 
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the Republic of Turkey, 2000), pp. 263-264. 
 63  
 of prosperity of our peoples. And second, to conclude a non-aggression 
agreement and to endeavor to settle our disputes through peaceful 
procedures.123  
 
Then Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in his explanatory reply dated 17 
April 1976 stated that Turkey repeats its readiness “to spend all necessary efforts to 
dispel the atmosphere of distrust prevailing in the relations between Turkey and 
Greece and to bring these relations to a level that should exist between two allied and 
neighboring countries”. Correspondence continued with the exchange of letters 
between Prime Ministers Demirel and Karamanlis, in which both statesmen openly 
laid out their concerns. Karamanlis in his reply indicated that “On the air-space, our 
reasonable proposals are still valid and they are open for further refinement” as well 
as stating that the continental shelf dispute should be brought before the ICJ124.  
This was followed by the “Complaint by Greece against Turkey to the United 
Nations Security Council on the Aegean Sea” on 10 August 1976. Resolution 395 of 
the UN Security Council125 advised the parties to seek solutions within the provisions 
of Chapter VI of the Charter. In line with this, it called upon the continuation of 
direct negotiations, while inviting both governments to a judicial settlement by the 
ICJ. Following this, on the very day, Greece registered to the Court instituting 
proceedings against the Republic of Turkey. Afterwards, on 11 November 1976, the 
Bern Agreement, which is fully devoted to the solution of the dispute on the 
continental shelf, was concluded between Greece and Turkey. It should be 
underlined that the terms of this agreement were never realized.  
                                                 
123 Hulusi Kılıç, (ed.). (2000), pp. 257-258. 
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125 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, (1976), p. 2936. For the text of the Resolution, see Appendix D. 
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  Another significant meeting took place on 30-31 January 1988 in Davos. 
During these meetings Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal 
decided to meet for reciprocal visits at least once a year. Also, 
 
The prime ministers agreed to establish two committees: One to 
explore the areas of cooperation such as economic cooperation, joint 
venture trade, tourism, communications, cultural exchanges and one to 
define the problem areas, exploring the possibilities of closing the gap 
and move towards lasting solutions, the progress of which will be 
reviewed by the two prime ministers, in this regard, they agreed to 
initiate, encourage and increase contacts among civilian and military 
officials, members of the press and businessmen and to establish a 
business council or a joint chamber of commerce and industry.126 
 
The Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Papandreou and Özal, also met in 
Brussels on 3 and 4 March 1988. In the joint press release it was stated that “The two 
sides exchanged views on problems related to national military exercises and military 
highs in the Aegean area.” Moreover it was indicated that “In this spirit, the two 
sides held a constructive exchange of views on the possibility of adopting certain 
practical measures with a view to contributing to the development of mutual 
confidence and understanding”.127 
In the Memorandum of Understanding between Greece and Turkey signed by 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the two states, Karolos Papoulias and Mesut 
Yılmaz, dated 27 May 1988, which took place in Athens, it was stated that “[…] 
without prejudice to the existing international regulations and procedures, the two 
sides will proceed, when required, to due communication through diplomatic 
channels”.128 This document was followed by the Guidelines for the Prevention of 
Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspace signed by the 
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 Foreign Ministers Papoulias and Yılmaz in İstanbul on 8 September 1988, which 
aimed to contribute to the confidence building process between the two sides.129  
In the aftermath of 1988, Greek-Turkish relations were once again in a 
stalemate in terms of efforts for the settlement of the Aegean disputes. This situation 
was to change once again with the outbreak of the Kardak/Imia Rocks Crisis in 
January 1996. In this respect, with regard to the application of methods of pacific 
settlement of disputes, Turkey has several note verbales, some of which are as 
follows: In a statement on Greek-Turkish Relations, dated 24 March 1996, Prime 
Minister Mesut Yılmaz stated that:  
 
I am therefore calling on Greece to enter into negotiations without 
preconditions with a view to settle all the Aegean questions as a 
whole. The search for a comprehensive and lasting solution will be 
conducted on the basis of respect for international law and the 
international agreements establishing the status quo in the Aegean. 
[…] When it comes to peaceful means of settlement which would 
be appropriate to the special nature of the Aegean questions, 
Turkey does not rule out from the outset any method based on 
mutual acceptance. We have no prejudices in this respect. 
Accordingly, we are prepared to discuss with goodwill appropriate 
third party methods of settlement. The form, conditions and legal 
requirements of such methods can be taken up in detail in the course of 
the talks.130  
 
 On 29 April 1997, Greece and Turkey agreed on the mandate of the wisemen 
group, and asked “the Netherlands Presidency to continue its facilitating role in this 
process”. 131  An important development took place in Madrid during the NATO 
Summit where the US Secretary Madeleine Albright hosted a meeting between the 
Greek and Turkish foreign ministers Theodoros Pangalos and İsmail Cem. During 
this meeting the two sides mutually committed themselves to “refrain from unilateral 
acts on the basis of mutual respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from 
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 misunderstanding; and […] to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual 
consent and without use of force or threat of force”.132 The Madrid Declaration did 
not achieve the desired goal either, and it was followed by two note verbales of 
Turkey dated 12 February 1998 and 11 March 1998, which underlined that “the two 
Governments should formalize the Madrid Declaration of 8 July 1997”. There were 
references to the methods of peaceful settlement of disputes. The latter note verbale 
made reference to the ICJ as a means of settlement.133  
In general terms, when an overview of the verbal notes, exchange of letters 
and statements between Greece and Turkey is studied, it can be observed that the 
general trend in Greek-Turkish bilateral correspondence is to blame the other party 
for the absence of a solution. The involvement of a third party, as it was in the 
presence of the US in the conclusion of the Madrid Declaration, did not help change 
this reality either. This general overview seems to have been the case especially after 
the 1970s, although both states agree that confidence has to be rebuilt between 
Greece and Turkey, and more importantly that a peaceful and friendly relationship is 
more favorable for both states than ongoing quarrels.  
It should also be noted that Greek-Turkish relations entered into a positive 
phase especially after the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey and Greece. The year 1999 
also corresponds to the time when Greece abandoned its veto policy towards Turkey 
with regard to its candidacy in the EU. In general terms, since 1999, agreements on 
various fields for building confidence are being concluded between the two sides. In 
terms of seeking solutions to the Aegean disputes, currently, exploratory talks are 
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 continuing between Greece and Turkey, and the 30th session of these talks took place 
on 6 May 2005 in Athens. Since these meetings are strictly confidential, 
developments taking place are not known to the public. However, when it is taken 
into consideration that the 30th meeting was realized recently, it can be hoped that the 
two sides have a more realistic and reasonable approach towards each other and that 
positive steps are taken in the quest for the settlement of the Aegean disputes. Given 
the outline of the bilateral attempts of the parties on achieving solutions, in the next 
chapter, the issue of delimitation of the territorial sea boundaries in the Aegean and 
proposals for the settlement of the territorial sea dispute will be studied.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DELIMITATION OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA BETWEEN 
GREECE AND TURKEY AND PROPOSALS FOR THE 
SETTLEMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA ISSUES 
 
 
4.1. Delimitation of the Territorial Sea Issue 
 
 The width of the territorial sea is a hot issue of the Aegean disputes. The 
delimitation of the territorial sea boundary, on the other hand, is a less-known but an 
important component of the territorial sea issue, which requires special attention. To 
this end, this very first section of Chapter IV will study aspects of the delimitation 
issue. In this context, currently, Greece and Turkey do not have a renewed delimited 
“maritime boundary” regulating the territorial waters of the two sides in the Aegean. 
This reality is expressed openly at times, and an example is the opinions delivered by 
General Çevik Bir, the Second Head of General Staff of the Turkish Army in 1997, 
who indicated that “There is no boundary delimited in the Aegean Sea between 
Greece and Turkey. The Aegean Sea is a sea without any limits.”134  
 As aforementioned, the Lausanne Peace Treaty did not determine a territorial 
sea boundary between Greece and Turkey.  However, between 1925 and 1926, the 
Official International Boundary Commission, established by Article 5 of the 
Lausanne Peace Treaty for the purpose of the demarcation of the land boundary 
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 between the two States, on the map prepared by the Commission and agreed by the 
parties with the Protocol of 3 November 1926, set up 
 
inter alia, an unconnected ‘international boundary line’ which starts at 
the mouth of the Maritsa River and runs seaward in a south-south-
easterly direction, thus ignoring the general direction of the Greek-
Turkish adjacent coasts.135 
 
This line seems to have delimited the territorial sea between adjacent coasts of Greece 
and Turkey in the northern Aegean Sea. In fact, the Commission’s line aimed at 
showing the ‘Greek-Turkish frontier’ rather than specifically intending to establish a 
line to separate the respective territorial waters of the two countries.136 Although this 
can be accepted as a delimitation of the territorial sea in the said region, due to the 
extension of this line further seaward by the Commission, it can also be argued that 
the boundary line has already lost its effect since it was established at a time when 
both States were practicing three n.m. of territorial waters.137 
 The sole agreement that regulates the territorial sea boundary between Greece 
and Turkey, which is in fact concluded between Italy and Turkey but to which 
Greece later became a party by means of succession, is, without doubt, the 4 January 
1932 Agreement. This agreement aims to determine  
 
the sovereignty over the islands lying between the island of 
Castellorizo, located at the Mediterranean, and the Anatolian coast. [… 
While doing so] The agreement also delimited the territorial sea 
between the coast of Anatolia and the island of Castellorizo together 
with its adjacent islets by Article 5.138  
 
The boundary line determined by this agreement constitutes the delimitation line 
between the two states around the island of Castellorizo. It should also be noted that 
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 the said delimitation line was further extended northwards on 28 December 1932 
with the signing of a document between Italy and Turkey. 
 
This document established a “frontier line” (la ligne frontierè) between 
the Dodecanese Islands and the Turkish coast and provided that up to a 
distance of 12 nautical miles between the territories of the contracting 
States, the line established would both separate sovereignty areas in the 
sea (déterminera la souveranité des deux Pays sur les eaux de la mer), 
and constitute a line which would divide the areas in which the islands 
would belong to the Party nearby. Beyond 12 nautical miles distance, 
the line would only regulate the sovereignty over islands, islets and 
rocks in the area.139 
 
The validity of the 28 December 1932 document is highly questionable, basically 
from the point of Turkey since it claims that the agreement was neither negotiated 
nor ratified by the TGNA according to Article 26 of the 1924 Turkish Constitution. 
Similarly, the Italian constitutional authorities also did not ratify the document. 
Moreover, related to the issue of sovereignty over some Aegean islands, the 
agreement has also a disputed status between Greece and Turkey.  
 
 
4.1.1. Why Is Delimitation of the Territorial Sea in the Aegean Necessary? 
 
 Given the status of the prior agreements regarding the delimitation of the 
territorial sea boundary between Greece and Turkey, an agreement for this purpose 
seems vital between the two states on their respective territorial waters where the 
coasts are adjacent or opposite to each other. Hence, Greece and Turkey should agree 
on certain delimitation before the issue becomes one that creates tension between the 
two sides.  
Although the Greek claim is that “The delimitation of the territorial sea 
between the Turkish coast and the Dodecanese islands took place according to the 
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 method of the median line in a treaty concluded in 1932 between Italy and 
Turkey,”140 for reasons explained in the previous section, this agreement falls short 
of regulating the territorial sea boundary between the two states. In this respect, 
differences in the perception of the two states in terms of methods of delimitation 
within their domestic laws are worth mentioning. Turkey, in Article 2 of its Law No. 
2674 enacted in 20 May 1982, states that  
 
Where the coasts are opposite or adjacent to the Turkish coasts, the 
boundary shall be determined by an agreement with the concerned 
state. This agreement should take into account all the factors of that 
region and should be in conformity with the principle of equity.141 
 
In this respect, Turkish preference in terms of achieving delimitation seeks a bilateral 
agreement, and emphasis is once more made on the principle of equity, whereas 
Greek Law No. 230 does not specify any precise method(s) of delimitation within its 
provisions.  
However, since the Aegean Sea constitutes a crucial region for international 
maritime navigation, the delimitation of the territorial sea boundary in the said area 
also has an international aspect. As it is indicated in the Judgement of the Court on 
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case; 
 
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it 
cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as 
expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of 
delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal 
State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with 
regard to other States depends upon international law.142  
 
In this respect, the delimitation of the territorial sea boundary between Greece and 
Turkey constitutes an important matter not only for the bilateral relations of the two 
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 states but also for international maritime navigation. In light of this situation, the next 
section will study different kinds of baselines in order to provide an outline of the 
methods applicable in the Aegean Sea during the delimitation of territorial sea 
boundaries between Greece and Turkey.  
 
 
4.1.2. Delimitation Methods and Different Kinds of Baselines 
 
Since the delimitation of territorial waters also has an international aspect, 
two basic components that should be taken into consideration during delimitation 
should be international navigation and fisheries143 in the concerned area.144 In this 
context, with regard to the delimitation of territorial waters, there are different kinds 
of baselines that can be adopted during this process. These different types of 
baselines are provided within the provisions of the UNCLOS. Accordingly, one type 
is the normal baseline. Article 5 of the UNCLOS indicates that “the normal baseline 
for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as 
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State”. The low-
water line,145 generally serves the purpose of defining basepoints that constitute the 
basis to measure the equidistance while establishing boundaries between states, and 
it is applicable both in areas where two states have opposite and/or adjacent coasts.146  
                                                 
143 Here, the term fisheries should mean to refer to and thus be perceived as historic fisheries rights. 
144 Mehmet Gönlübol. (1959), p. 87. 
145 Since the low-water line, to which an equivalent expression is ‘low-water mark’, is accepted to be 
the ordinary procedure, it is not explicitly mentioned in documents except in a few cases. For instance, 
the “Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus”, signed between Cyprus and the 
United Kingdom at Nicosia, on 16 August 1960 and the “Agreement between the Government of the 
Italian Republic and the Government of the Tunisian Republic Relating to the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf between the Two Countries”, signed on 20 August 1971 make direct references to 
the system of normal baseline and low-water mark. For further details, see Jonathan Charney, (ed.). 
Vol. I, pp. 154-155, vol. II pp. 1559-1569, 1611-1625. 
146  Louis B. Sohn. “Baseline Considerations” in International Maritime Boundaries, Jonathan 
Charney, (ed.), vol. I, (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), p. 154. 
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 Exceptions to the practice of normal baseline/low-water line are indicated in 
Article 7 where the system of straight baseline is defined. In this respect,  
 
In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if 
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the 
method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be 
employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured. 
 
The use of straight baselines proves to be functional while drawing an equidistant 
line where states want to overcome the complexities caused by sinuous coasts.147 
This method can also be applied in cases where deeply intended coasts are absent 
since the parties agree to apply this certain type of baselines.148  
The final concept that will be studied under this heading is 
equidistance/median line. In this respect, reference should be made to Article 15 of 
the UNCLOS, which sets the general rule for the “delimitation of the territorial sea 
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts”. The article reads as follows: 
 
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, 
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to 
the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States 
is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is 
                                                 
147 For instance, in the “Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea 
Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Two Countries, Including 
the Area Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters”, and in the “Agreement between the 
Government of Brazil and the Government France Relating to the Maritime Delimitation between 
Brazil and French Guiana”, there are references to the use of straight baselines. Moreover, 
“Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands relating to the 
delimitation of the Territorial Sea” signed on 18 December 1996 constitutes an example to the use of 
both normal baselines and equidistance within an agreement. For further details, see Jonathan 
Charney, (ed.). vol. I, (1996), pp. 929-975, 777-783, and vol. IV, pp. 2921-39. It should also be noted 
that straight baselines were used to be applied by Turkey “in certain bays such as Saros (Xeros), 
Edremit (Adramiyti), Izmir, Mandalya (Medflia) and Kos from 24 May 1965 until July 1973. Since 
July 1973, however, given the very special circumstances of the Aegean Sea and also the wish not to 
create any basis for counter-practices and any sort of abuse of rights by its neighbor, Turkey 
denounced this practice and abolished the chart that applied straight baselines in the mentioned 
areas.”(İnan and Başeren. (1996), p. 58). 
148 Louis B. Sohn. “Baseline Considerations”, in Charney (ed.), vol. I, (1996), p. 156-157. 
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 necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances 149 to 
delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at 
variance therewith. 
 
As indicated in Article 15, there is an exception to the general application of median 
line in cases when historic title or special circumstances are considered. In this 
respect, according to Article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, median line is a method adopted in the absence of a 
delimitation agreement. In line with this, the 1982 Convention has also accepted this 
principle, with the above exceptions. 
 
 
4.2. Proposals to Achieve Delimitation 
 
In areas where the territorial seas of two states overlap, there should be 
delimitation for the location of the territorial sea boundary. This fact is valid also for 
the case of Greece and Turkey. Building on data provided in the paragraph above of 
the previous section, it should also be noted that the principle of equidistance/median 
line may sometimes result in a way contrary to the principle of equity. In such cases, 
in order to create equity, this reality or the median line principle will lead the parties 
or in case of a third party settlement, the application of a modified median line.150 
This results in a more equitable and a just settlement which is achieved through 
                                                 
149 The expression “other special circumstances” can be regarded as deeply intended coasts, islands 
and islets in the immediate vicinity of the coast and as the size of the sea, etc. 
150 Similarly, in the “Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar 
and Bahrain”, with regard to the delimitation of the overlapping territorial waters where the 
equidistance/special circumstances rule would be applied, the Court stated that “The most logical and 
widely practiced approach is first to draw provisionally an equidistance line and then to consider 
whether that line must be adjusted in the light of the existence of special circumstances. [Within such 
an understanding, the Court] decided to employ the normal baseline as the place on natural features 
from which to construct the equidistant line, e.g. the low-water line, but noted that it still had to be 
decided whether the equidistant line should be adjusted because a feature might have a 
disproportionate effect on the equidistant line.” The Court also concluded “that Bahrain is not entitled 
to apply the method of straight baselines”. This is a point that seems to be to the disadvantage of 
Greece when delimitation in the Aegean Sea is concerned. For further details, see Jonathan Charney, 
(ed.). Vol. IV, (1996), pp. 2850-2851. 
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 bilateral agreement. Accordingly, whether the general rules outlined in the UNCLOS 
will be applied during delimitation in the Aegean Sea or not, first of all the parties 
should seek to determine the basics of the delimitation as well as methods and 
baselines to be applied by an agreement.151 During the delimitation process, the 
provisions of articles 122 and 123 of the UNCLOS should also be taken into account 
by the parties for an equitable settlement.  
In this respect, the application of normal baselines in the delimitation of the 
Aegean Sea seems to be an option which would provide equity under the given 
circumstances. However, while delimiting the territorial sea boundaries between the 
Turkish mainland and Greek islands, the method that should be applied, in principle, 
is the median line (equidistance).152 It should also be noted that the islets lying in 
close proximity of the Greek islands, when taken into consideration during 
delimitation, create disproportionality as in the case of Oinousa Islands situated off 
the shores of Chios. Thus, these should be disregarded during delimitation.153 For the 
maritime boundary between Greece and Turkey, concerning the outer edge of the 
                                                 
151 While delimiting the adjacent coasts, the delimitation protocol between Turkey and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, which after the dissolution of the Soviet Union became the “Protocol 
between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of Georgia on the 
Confirmation of the Maritime Boundaries between Them in the Black Sea” can provide and example. 
The “Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria on the Determination 
of the Boundary in the Mouth Area of the Mutludere/Rezovska River and Delimitation of the 
Maritime Areas between the Two States in the Black Sea” also can be accepted as a guideline in the 
delimitation of the adjacent coasts and the application of the principle of equidistance. For further 
details, see Jonathan Charney, (ed.). Vol. IV, (1996), pp. 2865-2886. 
152 The Koyun (Oinousa) Islands which lie in the north-east of the Sakız (Khios) Island in the Aegean, 
could be disregarded in calculations since these are within the three n.m. of the Greek territorial sea. 
In this context, the median line should be calculated between the Greek mainland from the point of 
Kardhamila and the Turkish mainland from the point of Karaburun. This sort of a practice will 
eliminate the probability of the application of “creeping jurisdiction”. This view of ours seems to be 
supported by the “United Nations: Letter from the Secretary General Transmitting to the Security 
Council the Final Report of the Demarcation of the International Boundary between Iraq and Kuwait”, 
signed on 21 May 1993, which states that “islands, rocks and reefs did not figure into the final 
delimitation”. Moreover, “the delimitation report guarantees a non-suspendible right of navigation in 
the waterways through which the boundary passes”, and this can be considered as a repeated 
guarantee of a legal principle. For further details, see Jonathan Charney, (ed.). Vol. III, (1996), pp. 
2387, 2391. 
153 See, footnote 149. 
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 boundary line that starts at the point where the River Meritsa meets the Aegean Sea, 
an equidistant line can be taken into account for delimitation.154  
If judicial settlement will be sought in the case of Greece and Turkey, the 
Tribunal should be asked about the rules to be adopted while delimiting territorial sea 
boundary between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean. In this respect, within the 
framework of the rules outlined by the Court, parties could negotiate details of 
delimitation in bilateral talks and practice rules laid out in the judgement of the 
Court.155  
 
 
4.3. Proposals for the Settlement of the Territorial Sea Dispute 
 
In general terms, to be able to achieve a solution to the Aegean disputes, first 
of all the issues to be settled by the two sides should be identified within the terms 
of mutual understanding. Afterwards, parties will be able to seek solutions through 
negotiations conducted in good faith, and throughout these negotiations, past 
agreements and talks should be taken into consideration to be able to make progress. 
In this context, when settlement of the breadth of territorial sea dispute is studied 
                                                 
154 A similar application is present in the “Maritime Boundary Agreement between the Government of 
the State of Israel and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan”, signed on 18 January 
1996. For further details, see Jonathan Charney, (ed.). Vol. III, (1996), pp. 2457-2461.  
155 In the Award of 17 December 1999 regarding the “Delimitation of maritime areas between the 
State of Eritrea and the Republic of Yemen”, the tribunal found “that the international boundary shall 
be a single all-purpose boundary which is a median line and that it should, as far as practicable, be a 
median line between the opposite coastlines”. For further details, see Jonathan Charney, (ed.). Vol. 
IV, (1996), pp. 2744-2745. This principle of single maritime boundary which is stated by the Tribunal 
in its judgement also constitutes a principle that should be taken into consideration in all delimitation 
related issues between Greece and Turkey. Also the “Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and 
the Republic of Lithuania on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf in the Baltic Sea” and the “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Estonia and the Government of the Republic of Latvia on the Maritime Delimitation in the Gulf of 
Riga, the Strait of Irbe and the Baltic Sea” express the establishment of a single maritime boundary. In 
addition, the latter agreement also refers to a continuing adjacent maritime boundary as it is applied in 
the agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey. For further details, see Jonathan Charney, (ed.). Vol. IV, 
(1996), pp. 2995-3017. 
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 separately, which is definitely not considered to be an issue on the part of Greece, it 
becomes possible to make a few proposals from the general to specific.  
One proposal may be that, since Greece has not yet extended its territorial 
waters to twelve n.m., Greece and Turkey may conclude an agreement on the width 
of the territorial sea, fixing the current limit of six n.m. for a certain period of time 
(like 5 years or 10 years) just as a display of good faith and a positive step for the 
rebuilding of confidence between the two countries. 156  Building upon this 
agreement, an agreement for the delimitation of the territorial sea boundary could 
also be achieved, which would be revised if the width of the territorial sea is 
changed after the former agreement becomes invalid. Hitherto, both states seem to 
have an “all or none” approach and neither of the two was willing to make any 
compromises, thereby such an agreement has not been achievable at least in the 
short term.157 
A second option is the inclusion of the territorial sea disputes within 
negotiations, which would probably be objected to by the Greek side since it does 
not want to legitimize an acceptance of the presence of such an issue. However, the 
width of the territorial sea issue constitutes the very basis for the solution of some 
other vital Aegean maritime disputes because depending on practiced limit, the areas 
to be delimited will change, (this includes the areas to be delimited in the 
continental shelf and in the territorial sea boundary). The set breadth will also affect 
the limit of Greek air space. In this context, it is highly important for both countries 
                                                 
156 An example is the “Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea concerning the Regime of the Soviet-
Korean State Frontier”, signed on 3 September 1990, where the parties were given the right to 
terminate the agreement after the end of the initial period, which is ten years from the date of the entry 
into force of the agreement. If neither of the parties expresses its desire to terminate the agreement 
within six months before the expiry date, the validity of agreement would automatically be considered 
as extended for 10 more successive years. For further details, see Jonathan Charney, (ed.). Vol. III, 
(1996), pp. 2299-2321. 
157 The formalization of the Madrid Declaration might constitute a positive step in this manner. 
 78  
 to discuss this very issue during bilateral talks and negotiations. In this context, the 
framework of the talks on this specific issue should include subheadings such as; 
• Who is/are to determine the application of the maximum width of territorial 
waters permitted by the UNCLOS in an area like the Aegean Sea? If the 
decision is solely left to the sovereign state, which factors does the sovereign 
state should take into account? 
• Are there any special circumstances in the Aegean Sea stemming from the 
distinct geography of the region? Can states raise other special circumstances 
apart from geography? 
• How to eliminate violations of claimed air space? 
• Whether international law requires the breadth of the territorial sea and the 
air space to be coterminous and identical or not? 
• Relevance of precedents of the exercise of different widths of territorial sea 
within the same region, and the reasons as to why such a practice is opted. 
In light of the guideline presented above, first of all, the rule laid out in 
Article 3 of the UNCLOS should be clarified between parties, since it is the starting 
point of the territorial waters issue. It should be underlined that Article 3 indicates 
that States may extend their territorial waters up to a limit which does not exceed 
twelve n.m.. Therefore, this rule does not oblige states to practice a uniform limit of 
twelve n.m. of territorial waters in their seas.158 In this respect, Article 3 enables 
states to claim different limits of territorial waters not exceeding twelve n.m.. 
However, since it wants to practice a uniform width of twelve n.m., Greece came up 
with a proposal to address Turkey’s concerns which might arise from a possible 
Greek practice of wider territorial sea in the Aegean, which stated that  
                                                 
158 It should be reminded that Greece proposed a uniform limit of twelve n.m. during the Third 
Conference of the UN Law of the Sea Conferences, however, this proposal was not accepted.  
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Any possible concern of Turkey (and other nations) about freedom of 
navigation can be accommodated either through the regime of straits 
and transit passage or, at most, by Greece’s not going to the full twelve 
miles but leaving designated channels as open sea for free passage 
where needed to connect the Turkish mainland to the open sea.159 
 
Nonetheless, this does not seem to be an acceptable option for Turkey as it believes 
that the exercise of twelve n.m. of territorial sea in the Aegean by Greece constitutes 
an abuse of rights which falls contrary to the principle of equity and one which cuts 
off the Turkish territorial sea in the area from the high seas.160 In addition to those 
claims, it can be argued that acquisition of territory through extension of territorial 
waters in the Aegean, especially in certain areas, will be illegal and thus unjustifiable 
not only for Turkey but also for the international community.  
Given conflicting views of the parties, an alternative solution lies within the 
fact that the twelve n.m. limit is not a rule that has to be applied uniformly.161 
Therefore, acceptance of the rule in this way constitutes one solution and there are 
several examples of states which do not claim a uniform territorial sea. 162  For 
instance, although Finland extended its territorial waters to twelve n.m. in general 
practice, when the midline with Estonia was concerned, it limited the width of its 
                                                 
159 Phaedon John Kozyris. “The Legal Dimension of the Current Greek-Turkish Conflict: A Greek 
Viewpoint” in Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios 
Triantaphyllon, (eds.), (Massachusetts, Brassey’s Inc., 2001), p. 106. 
160 Within transit passage, jurisdiction of the coastal state is limited to the advantage of the passing 
vessel, however, the high seas corridors provide complete freedom of passage within the concerned 
area. In this context, if Turkey accepts, in the Aegean, the Greek proposal to apply the regime of 
transit passage for straits used in international navigation as stated in the UNCLOS (Articles 34-44), 
this will have the meaning that Turkey accepts the extension of sovereign areas on the part of Greece 
in the concerned area. Moreover, although the regime of transit passage provides freedom of 
navigation and freedom of over flight, these freedoms do not diminish the sovereignty of Greece in 
areas concerned.  
161 Moreover, the twelve n.m. limit for territorial waters is not a sine quo non application for states. 
Currently there are many areas where states practice territorial waters less than twelve n.m. some of 
which can be listed as follows: Anguilla (3 n.m.), Bouvet Island (4 n.m.), British Indian Ocean 
Territory (3 n.m.), British Virgin Islands (3 n.m.), Coral Sea Islands (3 n.m.), Dominican Republic (6 
n.m.), Faroe Islands (3 n.m.), Gibraltar (3 n.m.), Greenland (3 n.m.), Guernsey (3 n.m.), Hong Kong 
(3 n.m.), Jan Mayen (4 n.m.), Jersey (3 n.m.), Jordan (3 n.m.), Montserrat (3 n.m.), Palau (3 n.m.), 
Pitcairn Islands (3 n.m.), Singapore (3 n.m.), Svalbard (4 n.m.). 
162  See the “Maritime Claims” section of the CIA World Fact Book located at  r 
www.odci.ogv/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2106.html. 
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 territorial waters to no more than 3 miles in the said point in the Gulf of Finland, for 
the purpose of enabling a high seas corridor to and for Russian or third flag states’ 
access to the Baltic.163 Another example is the case of Japan, which practices twelve 
n.m. as a limit in general. Japan, however, in certain bays such as the Eastern and 
Western Channels of Tsushima, Osumi, Soya and Tsugaru, limits its territorial 
waters to three n.m. for the preservation of high seas corridors. This regulation is 
quite similar to the South Korean practice in the Korea Strait where the limit of the 
sea is only three n.m. for the purpose of maintaining a high seas corridor.  
The practice of Turkey, on the other hand, constitutes an alternative to a 
uniform practice of twelve n.m. of territorial waters also, since Turkey exercises 
twelve n.m. of territorial waters in the Black Sea and Mediterranean whereas it keeps 
the limit of its territorial waters at six n.m. in the Aegean due to the special 
circumstances inherent in the geography of the area. In this context, the practice of 
Belize, which was adopted within terms of good faith for easing of its relations with 
Guatemala, can well set an example for the Greek-Turkish case. Belize exercises 
three n.m. of territorial waters in a precise section of the Gulf of Honduras to enable 
a high seas corridor to Guatemala in the western Caribbean, although it claims a limit 
of twelve n.m. in its general practice. 
Given the examples above, one proposal is that Greece and Turkey may limit 
their territorial waters in certain areas to a width less than six n.m. to enable high 
seas corridors.164 In return, Greece would give up its claim to exercise a uniform 
                                                 
163 The parties mutually agreed through exchange of notes to establish a 3 n.m. high seas corridor 
within the Gulf of Finland, in order to enable third party states, especially the Russian Federation to 
have free access through the high seas corridor to the Baltic Sea. For further details, see Jonathan 
Charney, (ed.). Vol. IV, (1996), pp. 3026-3027. 
164 For an unimpeded navigation for all vessels, traversing from the Aegean to the Mediterranean or 
the other seas, Greece might decrease its present six n.m. practice to create two high seas corridors. 
One can be between the islands of Evvoia and Andros going south through the islands of Kithnos and 
Serifos, and the second can be between the mainland and the island of Kea (Keos) or between the 
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 limit of twelve n.m. of territorial waters (whereas it would be able to extend its 
territorial waters to twelve n.m. in the Ionian Sea and the Mediterranean), and 
Turkey could accept, in certain areas where security of Turkey is not threatened and 
the freedom of navigation will not be impeded, twelve n.m. as the width of the 
territorial sea of Greece.165 In sum, this would be an extension of the territorial sea 
which does not constitute a uniform practice along the coasts and which leaves areas 
for high seas corridors. In this respect, access to the high seas will be enabled without 
passage through the territorial sea or the air space of either Greece or Turkey, or any 
area that any of the two States consider as its strategic national territory. 
 Finally, if judicial settlement is decided to be sought by the consent of the 
parties, the tribunal should be asked about the rules to be applied while determining 
the width of the territorial sea in the Aegean. The second question should be related 
to the limit of the airspace, more precisely whether it must be identical with the limit 
of the territorial sea or not. However, it should also be noted that for a case like this, 
judicial settlement by the mutual consent of the parties does not seem to be a possible 
option, given the past and the present attitudes of Greece and Turkey, and given the 
inability of the parties to agree on a compromise heretofore.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
islands of Kea and Kithnos by traversing to the Mediterranean through the Straits of Kithira and 
Andikithira. 
At present, there is a high seas corridor between the islands of Ikaria and Mikonos, Kos and Astipalaia 
(Stampalia), Rhodes and Karpathos that traverses to the Mediterranean through the Strait of Karpathos 
or through the Strait of Kasos between the islands of Crete and Kasos. 
165 Greece, at present, applies the straight baseline method in the Gulfs of Toronaios, Singitikos, 
Strimonikos. Since this practice of Greece does not violate international law, Turkey raises no 
objections to this Greek practice.  
 82  
  
 
CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The nature of Aegean disputes as to whether they are legal or political is a 
major question for scholars. Both states base their arguments on principles of 
international law, and in this sense even the territorial sea issue itself can be 
considered as a legal one. However, terms of international law, more precisely the 
UNCLOS does not provide an efficient basis to reach a settlement. Moreover, since 
the breadth of the territorial sea and the delimitation of territorial sea boundary are 
related to sovereign rights of states, it also assumes a political nature. It should also 
be noted that tensions between Greece and Turkey, which increase at times, escalate 
the Aegean disputes as well. For instance, the declaration of the TGNA in June 1995 
that Turkey would consider a further extension of Greek territorial waters in the 
Aegean as casus belli could cause a deadlock in bilateral relations. The attitude of 
both States towards each other constitutes the political aspect of disputes. The 
Aegean disputes can be accepted as legal issues embellished and complicated with 
political factors that require political will, thus they are a mixture of both.  
As provided in the examples studied in Section 3.3.3 of Chapter III, 
psychological aspects of the disputes should not be disregarded either. In this respect 
the note verbales exchanged between Greece and Turkey, where both States 
underline that they would like to maintain a peaceful and friendly relationship with 
each other but never refrain from constantly blaming the other party, constitute the 
exact illustration of the psychological element in Greek-Turkish relations, which is 
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 also inherent in the public opinion of both countries. This is why statesmen of both 
Greece and Turkey should try to make a positive change in the public opinion in their 
countries concerning perceptions of the other party. It is a fact that politicians of both 
states tried to obtain more votes by escalating tensions or by blaming the other state, 
and this has to be changed for good. Moreover, within the effort of changing public 
opinion in a positive way, the mass media of the two countries has a role as well, 
thus the events that take place should not be presented in a manner that would 
escalate the tensions between Greece and Turkey.  
Within the context of bilateral relations and official efforts, the genuine 
objective in negotiations should be frank efforts to solve the disputes. This is another 
reason as to why the disputes have a political nature as well as its legal aspects. 
Therefore, rebuilding of confidence has a major role. The past achievements of the 
two States in the early 1930s should not be disregarded, and can easily be taken as a 
good precedent between Greece and Turkey. If confidence could be built by the 
efforts of the two leaders, namely Atatürk and Venizelos, following an era of a 
devastating war for both sides, it may be questioned why it is not possible now to re-
create a new milieu like that in this century where interdependence between 
countries is very high and communication between states is supported by and 
enhanced through international organizations.  
All in all, disputes related to the Aegean Sea could not be resolved hitherto 
since mutual will to solve these disputes do not yet fully exist in the relationship 
between Greece and Turkey. Although the extent of the territorial waters dispute is 
not very well known by the public, it is plausibly the major issue between the two 
parties, since solution of other problems depends on a mutual agreement related to 
this very issue. In this respect, this dispute, which is not even considered to be a 
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 matter of conflict by Greece, is the one that should be settled first among other 
issues. Without bilateral talks and a mutual agreement on this issue, no solution can 
be sought through legal channels. The best examples to this are the UN Security 
Council Resolution 395 (1976)166 and the 1978 decision of the ICJ167. The Council in 
its judgement dated 25 August 1976 underlined that direct negotiations between 
Greece and Turkey is necessary to resolve their differences, and invited the parties to 
take into account judicial means. Following this decision, Greece applied to the ICJ 
in August 1976 but the Court declared in its judgement of December 1978 that it 
lacked jurisdiction over this issue, due to the Greek reservation on the 1928 General 
Act for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.  
In light of these findings, it is possible to conclude as to whether the Aegean 
problems are of legal or political nature. It is plausible to settle these disputes 
through legal means with the mutual consent of Greece and Turkey in case the 
parties fail to settle them through political means, since both states base their 
arguments on the norms of international law. However, what the two countries need 
most is political will to solve these disputes and to pursue diplomacy, not populist 
politics.168 First of all some kind of mutual understanding and confidence has to be 
built, and then, parties should aim at an equitable settlement for the disputes. 
Settlement proposals presented in the previous chapter, such as the conclusion of a 
temporary agreement for confidence building purposes, establishment of high seas 
corridors in certain areas in the Aegean Sea, and an agreement establishing a single 
maritime boundary between Greece and Turkey, may constitute a basis for 
negotiations. If any unresolved issue still remains, the rest of the disputes can be 
                                                 
166 For further information, see the UN resolution number 395 in reply to the complaint by Greece 
against Turkey dated 25 August 1976. 
167 For further information, see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Judgement of 
the Court, dated 19 December 1978. 
168 These disputes are used as a tool of politics by the politicians of the two countries. 
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 submitted to the ICJ. Nevertheless, if bilateral talks have positive consequences, then 
probably there will be no need to apply to the ICJ for this very dispute (as well as the 
other ones referred by title within this study).  
Despite the ongoing conflicts between Greece and Turkey on various 
subjects, currently there are positive efforts towards resolving disputes related to the 
Aegean. The rapprochement process between Greece and Turkey is going on since 
1999. Moreover, in March 2002 exploratory talks started between the two countries, 
these bilateral efforts are still continuing on a reciprocal basis. In light of these 
developments, it can once more be underlined that:  
 
Now, there is hope that Turkey and Greece have opened a new phase in 
their relations. Two natural disasters – earthquakes – in Turkey and 
Greece paved the way for bringing together the representatives of the 
two nations. Greece lifted its veto of Turkish membership in the 
European Union. Reciprocal high-level visits have taken place. Many 
agreements on cooperation in the field of soft issues have been 
concluded. Exchanges of journalists, businessmen, and artists are 
contributing to the improvement of relations between the countries.169 
 
Moreover, Turkey’s quest for a full membership in the EU continues and the Union 
is urging the states to settle their outstanding border disputes to be eligible for 
membership of the EU. In this context, positive steps can also be taken within the 
framework of the EU since Greece expresses that it supports Turkey’s candidacy. In 
this respect, it can be concluded that the two States have the potential to solve 
bilateral disputes if they genuinely continue to display efforts to this end.170 
 
 
 
                                                 
169 Aslan Gündüz. “Greek-Turkish Disputes” in Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization, 
Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios Triantaphyllon, (eds.), (Massachusetts, Brassey’s Inc., 2001), p. 82. 
170 Indeed, this will and the efforts displayed by the parties to this end are appreciated in the annual 
progress reports for Turkey (2004), prepared by the EU Commission. Moreover, the provisions of the 
December 1999 Helsinki Presidential Summit Conclusions (Article 4) and December 2004 Brussels 
Presidential Summit Conclusions (Article 20), which ask the parties to display efforts for a peaceful 
settlement should not be disregarded. For further details, see Appendix K. 
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APPENDIX A 
LAUSANNE PEACE TREATY 
VI. CONVENTION CONCERNING THE EXCHANGE OF GREEK AND 
TURKISH POPULATIONS 
Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923. 
The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Greek 
Government have agreed upon the following provisions: 
Article 1 
As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish 
nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish nationals of the 
Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of 
the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. 
These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the 
authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively. 
Article 2 
The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in Article 
1: 
a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople. 
b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace. 
All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, within the 
areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 
1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople. 
Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1918 
by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western 
Thrace. 
Article 3 
Those Greeks and Moslems who have already, and since the 18th October, 1912, left 
the territories the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of which are to be respectively 
exchanged, shall be considered as included in the exchange provided for in Article 1. 
The expression "emigrant" in the present Convention includes all physical and 
juridical persons who have been obliged to emigrate or have emigrated since the 18th 
October, 1912. 
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 Article 4 
All able-bodied men belonging to the Greek population, whose families have already 
left Turkish territory, and who are now detained in Turkey, shall constitute the first 
installment of Greeks sent to Greece in accordance with the present Convention. 
Article 5 
Subject to the provisions of Articles 9 and 10 of the present Convention, the rights of 
property and monetary assets of Greeks in Turkey or Moslems in Greece shall not be 
prejudiced in consequence of the exchange to be carried out under the present 
Convention.  
Article 6 
No obstacle may be placed for any reason whatever in the way of the departure of a 
person belonging to the populations which are to be exchanged. In the event of an 
emigrant having received a definite sentence of imprisonment, or a sentence which is 
not yet definitive, or of his being the object of criminal proceedings, he shall be 
handed over by the authorities of the prosecuting country to the authorities of the 
country whither he is going, in order that he may serve his sentence or be brought to 
trial.  
Article 7 
The emigrants will lose the nationality of the country which they are leaving, and 
will acquire the nationality of the country of their destination, upon their arrival in 
the territory of the latter country. 
Such emigrants as have already left one or other of the two countries and have not 
yet acquired their new nationality, shall acquire that nationality on the date of the 
signature of the present Convention.  
Article 8 
Emigrants shall be free to take away with them or to arrange for the transport of their 
movable property of every kind, without being liable on this account to the payment 
of any export duty or any other tax. 
Similarly, the members of each community (including the personnel of mosques, 
tekkes, meddresses, churches, convents, schools, hospitals, societies, associations 
and juridical persons, or other foundations of any nature whatever) which is to leave 
the territory of one of the Contracting States under the present Convention, shall 
have the right to take away freely or to arrange for the transport of the movable 
property belonging to their communities. 
The fullest facilities for transport shall be provided by the authorities of the two 
countries, upon the recommendation of the Mixed Commission provided for in 
Article 11. 
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 Emigrants who may not be able to take away all or part of their movable property 
can leave it behind. In that event, the local authorities shall be required to draw up, 
the emigrant in question being given an opportunity to be heard, an inventory and 
valuation of the property left by him. Procès-verbaux containing the inventory and 
the valuation of the movable property left by the emigrant shall be drawn up in four 
copies, one of which shall be kept by the local authorities, the second transmitted to 
the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11 to serve as the basis for the 
liquidation provided for by Article 9, the third shall be handed to the Government of 
the country to which the emigrant is going, and the fourth to the emigrant himself. 
Article 9 
Immovable property, whether rural or urban, belonging to emigrants, or to the 
communities mentioned in Article 8, and the movable property left by these 
emigrants or communities, shall be liquidated in accordance with the following 
provisions by the Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11. 
Property situated in the districts to which the compulsory exchange applies and 
belonging to religious or benevolent institutions of the communities established in a 
district to which the exchange does not apply, shall likewise be liquidated under the 
same conditions.  
Article 10 
The movable and immovable property belonging to persons who have already left 
the territory of the High Contracting Parties and are considered, in accordance with 
Article 3 of the present Convention, as being included in the exchange of 
populations, shall be liquidated in accordance with Article 9. This liquidation shall 
take place independently of all measures of any kind whatever, which, under the laws 
passed and the regulations of any kind made in Greece and in Turkey since the 18th 
October, 1912, or in any other way, have resulted in any restriction on rights of 
ownership over the property in question, such as confiscation, forced sale, &c. In the 
event of the property mentioned in this Article or in Article 9 having been submitted 
to a measure of this kind, its value shall be fixed by the Commission provided for in 
Article 11, as if the measures in question had not been applied. 
As regards expropriated property, the Mixed Commission shall undertake a fresh 
valuation of such property, if it has been expropriated since the 18th October, 1912, 
having previously belonged to persons liable to the exchange of populations in the 
two countries, and is situated in territories to which the exchange applies. The 
Commission shall fix for the benefit of the owners such compensation as will repair 
the injury which the Commission has ascertained. The total amount of this 
compensation shall be carried to the credit of these owners and to the debit of the 
Government on whose territory the expropriated property is situated. 
In the event of any persons mentioned in Articles 8 and 9 not having received the 
income from property, the enjoyment of which they have lost in one way or another, 
the restoration of the amount of this income shall be guaranteed to them on the basis 
of the average yield of the property before the war, and in accordance with the 
methods to be laid down by the Mixed Commission. 
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 The Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11 when proceeding to the 
liquidation of Wakf property in Greece and of the rights and interests connected 
therewith, and to the liquidation of similar foundations belonging to Greeks in 
Turkey, shall follow the principles laid down in previous Treaties with a view to 
fully safeguarding the rights and interests of these foundations and of the individuals 
interested in them. 
The Mixed Commission provided for in Article 11 shall be entrusted with the duty of 
executing these provisions. 
Article 11 
Within one month from the coming into force of the present Convention a Mixed 
Commission shall be set up in turkey or in Greece consisting of four members 
representing each of the High Contracting Parties, and of Nations from among 
nationals of Powers which did not take part in the war of 1914-1918. The Presidency 
of the Commission shall be exercised in turn by each of these three neutral members.  
The Mixed Commission shall have the right to set up, in such places as it may appear 
to them necessary, Sub-Commissions working under its order. Each such Sub-
Commission shall consist of a Turkish member, a Greek member and a neutral 
President to be designated by the Mixed Commission. The Mixed Commission shall 
decide the powers to be delegated to the Sub-Commission. 
Article 12 
The duties of the Mixed Commission shall be to supervise and facilitate the 
emigration provided for in the present Convention, and to carry out the liquidation of 
the movable and immovable property for which provision is made in Articles 9 and 
10. 
The Commission shall settle the methods to be followed as regards the emigration 
and liquidation mentioned above. 
In a general way the Mixed Commission shall have full power to take the measures 
necessitated by the execution of the present Convention and to decide all questions to 
which this Convention may give rise. 
The decisions of the Mixed Commission shall be taken by a majority.  
All disputes relating to property, rights and interests which are to be liquidated shall 
be settled definitely by the Commission.  
Article 13 
The Mixed Commission shall have full power to cause the valuation to be made of 
the movable and immovable property which is to be liquidated under the present 
Convention, the interested parties being given a hearing or being duly summoned so 
that they may be heard. 
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 The basis for the valuation of the property to be liquidated shall be the value of the 
property in gold currency. 
Article 14 
The Commission shall transmit to the owner concerned a declaration stating the sum 
due to him in respect of the property of which he has been dispossessed, and such 
property shall remain at the disposal of the Government on whose territory it is 
situated.  
The total sums due on the basis of these declarations shall constitute a Government 
debt from the country where the liquidation takes place to the Government of the 
country to which the emigrant belongs. The emigrant shall in principle be entitled to 
receive in the country to which he emigrates, as representing the sums due to him, 
property of a value equal to and of the same nature as that which he has left behind. 
Once every six months an account shall be drawn up of the sums due by the 
respective Governments on the basis of the declarations as above. 
When the liquidation is completed, if the sums of money due to both sides 
correspond, the accounts relating thereto shall be balanced. If a sum remains due 
from one of the Governments to the other Government after a balance has been 
struck, the debit balance shall be paid in cash. If the debtor Governments requests a 
postponement in making this payment, the Commission may (……..) such 
postponement, provided that the sum due be paid in three annuities at most. The 
Commission shall fix the interest to be paid during the period of postponement. 
If the sum to be paid is fairly large and requires longer postponement, the debtor 
Government shall pay in cash a sum to be fixed by the Mixed Commission, up to a 
maximum of 20 per cent. of the total due, and shall issue in respect of the balance 
loan certificates bearing such interest as the Mixed Commission may fix, to be said 
off within 20 years at most. The debtor Government shall assign to the service of 
these loans pledges approved by the Commission, which shall be administered and of 
which the revenues shall be encashed by the International Commission in Greece and 
by the Council of the Public Debt at Constantinople. In the absence of agreement in 
regard to these pledges, they shall be selected by the Council of the League of 
Nations. 
Article 15 
With a view to facilitating emigration, funds shall be advanced to the Mixed 
Commission by the States concerned, under conditions laid down by the said 
Commission. 
Article 16 
The Turkish and Greek Governments shall come to an agreement with the Mixed 
Commission provided for in Article 11 in regard to all questions concerning the 
notification to be made to persons who are to leave the territory of Turkey and 
Greece under the present Convention, and concerning the ports to which these 
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 persons are to go for the purpose of being transported to the country of their 
destination. 
High Contracting Parties undertake mutually that no pressure direct or indirect shall 
be exercised on the populations which are to be exchanged with a view to making 
than leave their homes or abandon their property before the date fixed for their 
departure. They likewise undertake to impose on the emigrants who have left or who 
are to leave the country no special taxes or dues. No obstacle shall be placed in the 
way of the inhabitants of the districts excepted from the exchange under Article 2 
exercising freely their right to remain in or return to those districts and to enjoy to the 
full their liberties and rights of property in Turkey and in Greece. This provision 
shall not be invoked as a motive for preventing the free alienation of property 
belonging to inhabitants of the said regions which are excepted from the exchange, 
or the voluntary departure of those among these inhabitants who wish to leave 
Turkey or Greece. 
Article 17 
The expenses entailed by the maintenance and working of the Mixed Commission 
and of the organisations dependent on it shall be borne by the Governments 
concerned in proportions to be fixed by the Commission. 
Article 18 
The High Contracting Parties undertakes to introduce in their respective laws such 
modifications as may be necessary with a view to ensuring the execution of the 
present Convention. 
Article 19 
The present Convention shall have the same force and effect as between the High 
Contracting Parties as if it formed part of the Treaty of Peace to be concluded with 
Turkey. It shall come into force immediately after the ratification of the said Turkey 
by the two High Contracting Parties. 
In faith whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, whose respective full Powers 
have been found in good and due form, have signed the present Convention. 
Done at Lausanne, the 30th January, 1923, in three copies, ons of which shall be 
transmitted to the Greek Government, one to the Government of the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey, and the third shall be deposited in the archives of the 
Government of the French Republic, which shall deliver certified copies to the other 
Powers signatory of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.  
(L.S.) E.K.Veniselos  
(L.S.) D.Caclamanos  
(L.S.) Ismet  
98 
 (L.S.) Dr.Ryza Nour  
(L.S.) Hassan 
Protocol 
The undersigned Turkish Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to that effect, declare 
that, without waiting for the coming into force of the Convention with Greece of 
even date, relating to the exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations, and by way 
to exception to Article 1 of that Convention the Turkish Government, on the 
signature of the Treaty of Peace, will release the able-bodied men referred to in 
Article 4 of the said Convention, and will provide for their departure. 
Done at Lausanne, the 30th January, 1923. 
 
Source: www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/ed/eda/edaa/default.6.html 
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APPENDIX B 
AEGEAN SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE 
(JURISDICTION OF THE COURT) 
Judgment of 19 December 1978 
Summary 
In its judgment on the question of its jurisdiction in the case concerning the Aegean 
Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), the Court, by 12 votes to 2, found that it is 
without jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Government of Greece. 
The Court was composed as follows: President Jiménez de Aréchaga; Vice-President 
Nagendra Singh; Judges Forster, Gros, Lachs, Dillard, de Castro, Morozov, Sir 
Humphrey Waldock, Ruda, Mosler, Elias and Tarazi; Judge ad hoc Stassinopoulos. 
Of the 12 Members of the Court who voted for the decision, Vice-President 
Nagendra Singh and Judges Gros, Lachs, Morozov and Tarazi have appended 
separate opinions or declarations. 
Dissenting opinions have been appended to the Judgment by Judge de Castro and 
Judge ad hoc Stassinopoulos. 
Procedure, and Summary of Negotiations (paras. 1-31)  
In its Judgment, the Court recalls that on 10 August 1976 Greece instituted 
proceedings against Turkey in respect of a dispute concerning the delimitation of the 
continental shelf appertaining to each of the two States in the Aegean Sea and their 
rights thereover. In a letter of 26 August 1976 Turkey expressed the view that the 
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Application. 
Greece requested the Court to indicate interim measures of protection, but in an 
Order of 11 September 1976 the Court found that the circumstances were not such as 
to require them and decided that the written proceedings should first be addressed to 
the question of its jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. Greece subsequently filed a 
Memorial and presented oral arguments at public sittings, formally submitting that 
the Court had such jurisdiction. Turkey did not file any Counter-Memorial and was 
not represented at the hearings. Its attitude was, however, defined in the above-
mentioned letter and in communications addressed to the Court on 24 April and 
10 October 1978. (Paras. 1-14.) 
While regretting that Turkey did not appear in order to put forward its arguments, the 
Court points out that it nevertheless had to examine proprio motu the question of its 
own jurisdiction, a duty reinforced by the terms of Article 53 of its Statute, according 
to which the Court, whenever a party does not appear, must, before finding upon the 
merits, satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction. (Para. 15.) 
After giving a brief account of the negotiations which have taken place between 
Greece and Turkey since 1973 on the question of delimiting the continental shelf, the 
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 Court finds contrary to suggestions by Turkey, that the active pursuit of negotiations 
concurrently with the proceedings is not, legally, any obstacle to its exercise of its 
judicial function, and that a legal dispute exists between Greece and Turkey in 
respect of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. (Paras. 16-31.) 
First Basis of Jurisdiction Relied Upon: Article 17 of the General Act of 1928 (paras. 
32-93)  
In its Application the Greek Government specified two bases on which it claimed to 
found the jurisdiction of the Court in the dispute. The first was Article 17 of the 
General Act of 1928 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, read with 
Article 36, paragraph 1, and Article 37 of the Statute of the Court. 
Article 17 of the General Act reads as follows: 
"All disputes with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective 
Rights shall, subject to any reservations which may be made under Article 39, be 
submitted for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice, unless the 
parties agree, in the manner hereinafter provided, to have resort to an arbitral 
tribunal. It is understood that the disputes referred to above include in particular 
chose mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice." 
This Article thus provided for the reference of disputes to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. That body was the predecessor of the present Court, which, by 
the effect of Article 37 of its own Statute, is substituted for it in any treaty or 
convention in force which provides for reference of a matter to the Permanent Court. 
Hence, if the General Act is to be considered a convention in force between Greece 
and Turkey, it may, when read with Article 37 and Article 36, paragraph 1, of the 
present Court's Statute, suffice to establish the latter's jurisdiction. (Paras. 32-34.)  
The question of the status of the General Act of 1928 as a convention in force for the 
purposes of Article 37 of the Statute was raised, though not decided, in previous 
cases before the Court. In the present case the Greek Government contended that the 
Act must be presumed to be skill in force as between Greece and Turkey; the Turkish 
Government, on the contrary, took the position that the Act was no longer in force. 
(Paras. 35-38.) 
The Court notes that Greece drew attention to the fact that both the Greek and the 
Turkish instruments of accession to the Act were accompanied by reservations. 
Greece affirmed that these were irrelevant to the case. Turkey, on the other hand, 
took the position that, whether or not the General Act was assumed to be in force, 
Greece's instrument of accession, dated 14 September 1931, was subject to a clause, 
reservation (b), which would exclude the Court's competence with respect to the 
dispute. (Para. 39.) 
The text of this reservation (b) is as follows: 
"The following disputes are excluded from the procedures described in the General 
Act . . . 
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 "(b) disputes concerning questions which by international law are solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of States, and in particular disputes relating to the territorial 
status of Greece, including disputes relating to its Rights of sovereignty over its ports 
and lines of communication." 
The Court considers that, if Turkey's view of the effect of reservation (b) on the 
applicability of the Act as between Greece and Turkey with respect to the subject-
matter of the dispute is justified, a finding on the question whether the Act is or is not 
in force would cease to be essential for the decision regarding the Court's 
jurisdiction. (Para. 40.) 
According to Greece, the Court should leave reservation (b) out of account because 
the question of its effect on the applicability of the General Act was not raised 
regularly by Turkey in accordance with the Rules of Court, so that Turkey could not 
be regarded as having "enforced" the reservation as required by Article 39, paragraph 
3, of the General Act, whereby: "If one of the parties to a dispute has made a 
reservation, the other parties may enforce the same reservation in regard to that 
party." In the Court's view, Turkey's invocation of reservation (b) in a formal 
statement made in response to a communication from the Court must be considered 
as constituting an "enforcement" of the reservation within the meaning of Article 39, 
paragraph 3, of the Act. The Court was therefore unable to leave out of its 
consideration a reservation the invocation of which had been properly brought to its 
notice earlier in the proceedings. (Paras. 41-47.) 
Greece maintained that reservation (b) could not be considered as covering the 
dispute regarding the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea and therefore did not 
exclude the normal operation of Article 17 of the Act. It contended in particular that 
the reservation did not cover all disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece 
but only such as both related to its territorial status and at the same time concerned 
"questions which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of 
States". (Paras. 48 and 49.) 
This contention depended on an essentially grammatical interpretation which hinged 
on the meaning to be ascribed to the expression "and in particular" ("et, notamment," 
in the original French of the reservation). After considering this argument, the Court 
finds that the question whether that expression has the meaning attributed to it by 
Greece depends on the context in which it was used in the instrument of accession 
and is not a matter simply of the preponderant linguistic usage. The Court recalls that 
it cannot base itself on a purely grammatical interpretation of the text and observes 
that a number of substantive considerations point decisively to the conclusion that 
reservation (b) contained two separate and autonomous reservations. (Paras. 50-56.) 
One such consideration was that in framing its declaration accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court under the optional clause of the latter's Statute - a 
declaration made on 12 September 1929, only two years before the Greek accession 
to the General Act - Greece included a provision which, indisputably, was an 
autonomous reservation of "disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece". It 
can hardly be supposed that Greece, in its instrument of accession to the General Act, 
should have intended to give to its reservation of "disputes relating to the territorial 
status of Greece" a scope which differed fundamentally from that given to it in that 
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 declaration. That Greece had had such an intention was not borne out by the 
contemporary evidence placed before the Court relating to the making of the 
declaration and the deposit of the instrument of accession. 
That being so, the Court finds that reservation (b) comprises two distinct and 
autonomous reservations, one affecting disputes concerning questions of domestic 
jurisdiction and the other reserving "disputes relating to the territorial status of 
Greece". (Paras. 57-68.) 
* 
* * 
The Court then goes on to consider what "disputes relating to the territorial status of 
Greece" must be taken to mean. 
Greece maintained that a restrictive view of the meaning must be taken, by reason of 
the historical context, and that those words related to territorial questions bound up 
with the territorial settlements established by the peace treaties after the first World 
War. In the Court's opinion, the historical evidence relied on by Greece seems rather 
to confirm that in reservation (b) the expression "territorial status" was used in its 
ordinary, generic sense of any matters properly to be considered as belonging to the 
concept of territorial status in public international law. The expression therefore 
included not only the particular legal régime but the territorial integrity and the 
boundaries of a State. (Paras. 69-76.)  
Greece argued that the very idea of the continental shelf was wholly unknown in 
1928 when the General Act was concluded, and in 1931 when Greece acceded to the 
Act. But, in the Court's view, since the expression "territorial status" was used in the 
Greek reservation as a generic term, the presumption necessarily arises that its 
meaning, as also that of the word "rights" in Article 17 of the General Act, was to 
follow the evolution of the law and to correspond with the meaning attached to it by 
the law in force at any given time. The Court therefore finds that the expression 
"disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece" must be interpreted in 
accordance with the rules of international law as they exist today and not as they 
existed in 1931. (Paras. 77-80.) 
The Court then proceeds to examine whether, taking into account the developments 
in international law regarding the continental shelf, the expression "disputes relating 
to the territorial status of Greece" should or should not be understood as comprising 
disputes relating to the geographical extent of Greece's rights over the continental 
shelf in the Aegean Sea. Greece contended that the dispute concerned the 
delimitation of the continental shelf, said to be entirely extraneous to the notion of 
territorial status, and that the continental shelf, not being part of the territory, could 
not be considered as connected with territorial status. The Court observes that it 
would be difficult to accept the proposition that delimitation is entirely extraneous to 
the notion of territorial status and points out that a dispute regarding delimitation of a 
continental shelf tends by its very nature to be one relating to territorial status, 
inasmuch as a coastal State's rights over the continental shelf derive from its 
sovereignty over the adjoining land. It follows that the territorial status of the coastal 
State comprises, ipso jure, the rights of exploration and exploitation over the 
continental shelf to which it is entitled under international law. (Paras. 80-89.) 
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 Having regard to those considerations, the Court is of the opinion that the dispute is 
one which relates to the territorial status of Greece within the meaning of reservation 
(b) and that Turkey's invocation of the reservation had the effect of excluding the 
dispute from the application of Article 17 of the General Act. The General Act is 
therefore not a valid basis for the Court's jurisdiction. (Para. 90.) 
* 
* * 
The Court also takes into consideration a suggestion that the General Act had never 
been applicable as between Turkey and Greece, by reason of the existence of the 
Greco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration signed 
on 30 October 1930. It finds that it is dispensed from any need to enter into the 
question of the effect of the 1930 treaty on the applicability of the General Act, 
because it has established that, by the effect of reservation (b), the Act is not 
applicable to the dispute, and because the 1930 treaty was not invoked as a basis for 
its jurisdiction. (Paras. 91-93.) 
Second Basis of Jurisdiction Relied Upon: the Brussels Joint Communiqué of 31 May 
1975 (paras. 94-108)  
The second basis of jurisdiction relied upon by Greece was the Brussels Joint 
Communiqué of 31 May 1975. This was a communiqué issued directly to the press 
by the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey following a meeting between them on 
that date. It contained the following passage: 
"They [the two Prime Ministers] decided that those problems [between the two 
countries] should be resolved peacefully by means of negotiations and as regards the 
continental shelf of the Aegean Sea by the International Court at The Hague." 
Greece maintained that this passage directly conferred jurisdiction on the Court, 
committed the parties to concluding any implementing agreement needed and, in the 
event of refusal by one of them to conclude such an agreement, permitted the other to 
refer the dispute unilaterally to the Court. Turkey, for its part, maintained that the 
communiqué did not "amount to an agreement under international law", and that in 
any event it did not comprise any undertaking to resort to the Court without a special 
agreement (compromis) or amount to an agreement by one State to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the Court upon the unilateral application of the other. (Paras. 94-99.)  
In view of these divergent interpretations, the Court considers what light is thrown 
on the meaning of the communiqué by the context in which the meeting of 
31 May 1975 took place and the document was drawn up. It finds nothing to justify 
the conclusion that Turkey was prepared to envisage any other reference to the Court 
than a joint submission of the dispute. In the information before it on what followed 
the Brussels communiqué the Court finds confirmation that the two Prime Ministers 
did not undertake any unconditional commitment to refer their continental shelf 
dispute to the Court. (Paras. 100-106.) 
Hence the Brussels communiqué did not constitute an immediate and unqualified 
commitment on the part of the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey to accept the 
submission of the dispute to the Court unilaterally by Application. It follows that it 
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 does not furnish a valid basis for establishing the Court's jurisdiction. The Court adds 
that nothing it has said may be understood as precluding the dispute from being 
brought before the Court if and when the conditions for establishing its jurisdiction 
are satisfied. (Paras. 107 and 108.) 
* 
* * 
For these reasons, the Court finds that it is without jurisdiction to entertain the 
Application filed by the Government of Greece on 10 August 1976. (Para. 109.) 
Source: http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/igt/iGT_isummaries/igt_isummary_19781219.htm 
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APPENDIX C 
 
SELECTED ARTICLES FROM the UN LAW of the SEA CONVENTION 
(UNCLOS) 
 
Article 3  
Breadth of the territorial sea 
 
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with 
this Convention.  
 
Article 4 
Outer limit of the territorial sea 
 
The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance 
from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea. 
 
Article 5 
Normal baseline 
 
Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as 
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State. 
 
Article 7 
Straight baselines 
 
1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight 
baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
2. Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions the coastline 
is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the furthest seaward 
extent of the low-water line and, notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-
water line, the straight baselines shall remain effective until changed by the coastal 
State in accordance with this Convention. 
3. The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from 
the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be 
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal 
waters. 
4. Straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless 
lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been 
built on them or except in instances where the drawing of baselines to and from such 
elevations has received general international recognition. 
5. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, account 
may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to 
the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced 
by long usage.  
106 
 6. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as 
to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone. 
 
Article 33  
Contiguous zone 
 
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the 
coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or 
territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed 
within its territory or territorial sea.  
2. The contiguous zone may riot extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
 
Article 74 
Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts 
 
1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as 
referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to 
achieve an equitable solution. 
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States 
concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV. 
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit 
of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be 
without prejudice to the final delimitation. 
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions 
relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone shall be determined in 
accordance with the provisions of that agreement. 
 
Article 83 
Delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts 
 
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve 
an equitable solution. 
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States 
concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV.  
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit 
of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be 
without prejudice to the final delimitation. 
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 4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions 
relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance 
with the provisions of that agreement. 
 
Article 121  
Regime of islands 
 
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide.  
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.  
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall 
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.  
 
Article 122  
Definition 
 
For the purposes of this Convention, "enclosed or semi-enclosed sea" means a gulf, 
basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the 
ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and 
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.  
 
Article 123  
Co-operation of States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas 
 
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-operate with each other 
in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this 
Convention. To this end they shall endeavor, directly or through an appropriate 
regional organization:  
(a) to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the 
living resources of the sea; (b) to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and 
duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment; (c) 
to co-ordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate joint 
programmes of scientific research in the area; (d) to invite, as appropriate, other 
interested States or international organizations to co-operate with them in furtherance 
of the provisions of this article.  
 
Article 300  
Good faith and abuse of rights 
 
States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this 
Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this 
Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.  
 
 
Source: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm 
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APPENDIX D 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION No. 395 
 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1976/scres76.htm 
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APPENDIX E 
 
BERN AGREEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE  
(11 November 1976) 
1. The two parties agree that negotiations shall be frank, throughgoing and 
pursued in good faith, with a view to reaching an agreement based on their mutual 
consent with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf as between 
themselves.  
2. The two parties agree that these negotiations shall by their very nature be 
strictly confidential.  
3. The two parties reserve their respective positions with regard to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf.  
4. The two parties undertake not in any circumstances to make use of the 
provisions of this document, or such proposals as may be made by either side during 
these negotiations, outside the context of the negotiations themselves.  
5. The two parties agree that there shall be no statements or leaks to the 
press on the contents of the negotiations, unless they decide otherwise by common 
accord.  
6. The two parties undertake to refrain from any initiative or act concerning 
the Aegean Continental Shelf that might trouble the negotiations.  
7. The two parties each undertake, so far as their bilateral relations are 
concerned to refrain from any initiative or act likely to throw discredit on the other.  
8. The two parties have agreed to study the practice of States and the 
international rules on the subject, with a view to eliciting such principles and 
practical criteria as might be of use in the case of the delimitation of the continental 
shelf between the two countries.  
9. To that end, a mixed commission will be set up to be composed of 
national representatives.  
10. The two parties agree to adopt a gradual rhythm in the negotiating process 
to be followed, after mutual consultation.  
Done in Berne, in two copies, in the French language, 11 November 1976 
Jean TZOUNIS, Ali Suat BİLGE, 
Head of the Hellenic 
delegation 
Head of the Turkish 
delegation 
 
Source: Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, (1976), p. 2936  
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APPENDIX F 
 
DECLARATION ADOPTED BY THE 15 MINISTERS OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS OF THE E.U. AT THE LAST GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL 
 
Brussels, 15 July 1996 
SN 3543/96 
 
MEDA FINANCIAL REGULATION : 
DECLARATIONS TO BE ENTERED IN THE MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL  
 
i. Council Declaration  
The European Union has followed with serious concern the situation that has 
emerged as a consequence of the issue raised by Turkey concerning the Imia Islets.  
 
The resulting frictions involve, on the one hand, a Member State with which a 
natural solidarity exists and, on the other hand, a neighbouring country with which 
the European Community wishes to develop further a relationship of dialogue and 
cooperation in all the fields resulting from the Customs Union.  
 
The Council recalls its attachment to the development of good neighbourly relations 
among all countries of the region. In this context, the Council recalls that relations 
between Turkey and the European Union have to be based on a clear commitment to 
the principle of respect for international law and agreements, the relevant 
international practice, and the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Member 
States and of Turkey.  
 
The Council considers that disputes should be settled solely on the basis of 
international law. Therefore, the Council calls for restraint and avoidance of any 
action liable to increase tensions, and specifically the use or threat of force, and 
considers appropriate that dialogue should be pursued along the lines which have 
emerged in previous contacts between the interested parties which may contribute to 
the improvement of bilateral relations as well as to the establishment of a crisis 
prevention mechanism.  
 
The Council further underlines that the cases of disputes created by territorial claims, 
such as the Imia Islet issue, should be submitted to the International Court of Justice.  
 
The Council requests the Presidency to invite Turkey to indicate whether she 
commits herself to the aforementioned principles.  
 
ii. Commission Declaration  
 
The Commission declares that the adoption of the MEDA Regulation opens the way 
for the practical implementation once the Regulation has been published in the 
Official Journal.  
 
It is however not to be expected that any formal financing decisions will be adopted 
before the second week of September.  
 
Source: www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/declaration.htm  
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF TGNA DECLARATION, 121ST SESSION,   
8 JUNE 1995 * 
 
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, at its 121st session held on 8 June 
1995, having considered the situation that has emerged as a result of the ratification 
of the UN Law of the Sea Convention by the Greek Parliament, and thus setting the 
ground for its implementation, unanimously adopted the following declaration. 
 The Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923 established an equilibrium in the 
Aegean, which is a common sea between Turkey and Greece. The breadth of the 
territorial sea of both countries at that time has been determined as 3 nautical miles. 
The maritime areas beyond national sovereignty have thus constituted over 70 
percent of the Aegean. 
 Greece by extending the breadth of its territorial sea to six nautical miles in 
1936, acquired sovereignty over 43.68 percent, which is almost half of the Aegean. 
The territorial sea of Turkey, which was extended to six nautical miles lately in 1964, 
currently comprises approximately 7 percent of the Aegean. At present, almost half 
of the Aegean has the status of high seas.  
 Greece has lately made known its desire to extend its territorial sea to twelve 
nautical miles, making use of certain provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention 
that have essentially been designed for open seas and ocean areas. In the case this 
aspiration is realized, Greece would acquire sovereignty over almost 72 percent of 
the Aegean Sea.  
 It is inconceivable to expect that Turkey, a peninsula, would by any means go 
along with such an eventuality that would result in Turkey’s access to high seas and 
oceans of the world by passing through Greek territorial sea. Turkey has vital 
interests in the Aegean. 
 While hoping that the Greek Government shall not decide to extend its 
territorial sea in the Aegean beyond the present six miles limit, which in turn would 
ruin the equilibrium established by the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, has decided to grant the Turkish Government all powers, 
including those that may be deemed necessary in the military field, for safeguarding 
and defending the vital interests of Turkey in such eventuality. The Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey has also decided to announce this to the Greek and world public 
opinion in a spirit of friendship 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
* Translated by the author 
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APPENDIX H 
 
 
TURKISH TERRITORIAL WATERS LAW - LAW NO. 2674, 20 MAY 1982 
 
Art. 1. Turkish territorial waters are a part of the Turkish territory. The breadth of 
the Turkish territorial waters is 6 miles. The Council of Ministers is authorized to 
extend the breadth of the Turkish territorial waters beyond 6 miles, in certain seas, 
taking into consideration all the features of that sea in conformity with the principles 
of equity. 
 
Art. 2. Where the coasts are opposite or adjacent to the Turkish coasts, the boundary 
shall be determined by an agreement with the concerned state. This agreement should 
take into account all the factors of that region and should be in conformity with the 
principle of equity. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
ARTICLE 31 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE 
TREATIES 
 
General Rule of Interpretation 
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
  
Source: http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm 
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APPENDIX J 
 
U.S. STATEMENT TO FOLLOW BILATERAL MEETING 
(Madrid Declaration) 
 
   Madrid, July 08, 1997 
 
Secretary Albright hosted a meeting at the NATO summit in Madrid between Greece 
Foreign Minister Pangalos and Turkish Foreign Minister Cem. During their meeting 
the Turkish and Greece Ministers reached a convergence of views on a basis for 
promoting better relations on the following lines: 
 
A mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development of 
good neighborly relations; 
 
Respect for each other’s sovereignty; 
 
Respect for the principles of international law and international agreements; 
 
Respect for each other’s legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the Aegean 
which are of great importance for their security and national sovereignty; 
 
Commitment refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual respect and 
willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding; and  
 
Commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and 
without use of force or threat of force. 
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APPENDIX K 
 
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL – 10/11 DECEMBER 1999 
Article 4 
 
The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which 
now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate States 
are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the 
values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect 
the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make 
every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. 
Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation 
relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the 
accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International 
Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council 
recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen 
European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that 
compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union. 
 
 
 
BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL – 16/17 DECEMBER 2004 
 
Article 20 
 
The European Council, while underlining the need for unequivocal commitment to 
good neighbourly relations welcomed the improvement in Turkey's relations with its 
neighbours and its readiness to continue to work with the concerned Member States 
towards resolution of outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of 
peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In 
accordance with its previous conclusions, notably those of Helsinki on this matter, 
the European Council reviewed the situation relating to outstanding disputes and 
welcomed the exploratory contacts to this end. In this connection it reaffirmed its 
view that unresolved disputes having repercussions on the accession process, should 
if necessary be brought to the International Court of Justice for settlement. The 
European Council will be kept informed of progress achieved which it will review as 
appropriate. 
 
